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ABSTRACT 
Developing a national strategy to effectiv ely coordinate inform ation sharing and 
the subsequent dissemination of in telligence is  paramount in dom estic efforts to th wart 
future acts of terror and suppress crim e. Past  failures illustrate the need for strong and 
trustworthy partnerships not only between federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement, 
but also with relevant partners in the priv ate sector, foreign  allies and other governm ent 
agencies. Standardizing  operations  and be tter utilizing technol ogy will im prove th e 
efficacy of this effort an d will draw  upon the dom estic law enforcement community as 
key players in this endeavor.  
The findings and recommendations proffered in this research identify policies and 
practices th at effectively integrate infor mation sharing into  all a spects of  policing and 
provide for technological solutions to enhan ce capabilities for collecting inform ation and 
disseminating intelligence. Integrating intelligence led-policing into existing comm unity 
policing strategies  also  illust rates th e utility  of both public and private partners in  this  
effort. Ultim ately, the enhanced  collec tion of  inf ormation and dissem ination of 
intelligence will gr eatly augm ent the ability of  law enf orcement and the m yriad of 
relevant stakeholders to prevent both crime and acts of terrorism.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
American law enforcem ent executives  are progressively acknowledging the 
relevance of infor mation sharing and the cr iticality of intelligence in guiding their 
decision making pertaining to both crim e and counter-terrorism strategies.  As roughly 
three quarters of the state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies in the United States 
have fewer than 24 sworn officers, they are la rgely unable to have personnel dedicated to 
intelligence positions  and thu s rely  on partner agencies, including federal law  
enforcement, to f ill intelligence voids. Concomitantly, as th ese organizations have close 
interaction with the communities they patrol on a daily basis, the federal government and 
non-federal allies equ ally rely on them to  gather and  share intelligence and  raw  
information. In order to im prove hom eland security as well as public safety, law 
enforcement at the tribal, state and local levels must be equipped with the necessary tools 
and resources for collecting, receiving and sharing inf ormation and intelligence. 
Technology serves as a significant com ponent of this process and provides for  
considerable opportunities to include the public  sector, private sector and comm unity at 
large in this collaborative task of  sa feguarding neighborhoods from both crim e and 
terrorism.  
On June 9, 2009, the Secretary of Hom eland Security signed a m anagement 
directive, which identifies th e mission, goals and responsibilit ies for state and local law  
enforcement under the purview of the Depart ment of Hom eland Sec urity. W ithin that 
directive, S ecretary Napolitano ad dressed th e i mportance of non-federal partners in  
Section V, “ Policy and Requirements,” which reads in part, “It is  the policy of DHS to  
make state, tribal, and local law enforcem ent agencies full partners in homeland security 
policymaking and to coordinate their input of these partners acr oss the Departm ent” 
(DHS Directive #252–11, Revision #00). Just as the old African Proverb states, “It takes  
a village to raise a ch ild,” this thes is argues tha t it take s a community, or what will be  
referred to as a “megacommunity,” to effectively fight crime and terrorism. Additionally, 
it will detail the means for achieving this goal.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Homeland Security  Presidential Direct ive (HSPD-8) addresses the topic of 
national preparedness and, specifically, the need to “prevent and respond to threatened or 
actual domestic ter rorist atta cks, major disa sters, and other em ergencies by requiring a 
national dom estic all-h azards prep aredness goal” (Departm ent of Hom eland Security  
[DHS], 2003). Leveraging technology is essential in achieving this preparedness goal and 
specifically in clos ing the in telligence gaps,  which hav e been a d eficiency fo r the 
intelligence community for many years.  
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a substantial 
amount of literature devoted to the failures of the intelligence community. Among the six 
problems identified by the 9/11 Commission in describing the need to restructure the 
intelligence community were: the complexity and secrecy of intelligence sharing, the lack 
of common standards an d structu ral barriers to p erforming joint inte lligence work.  In 
regard to structural barriers, it stated: 
National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of 
the home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all 
source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to 
“connect the dots.” (National Comm ission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States [9/11 Commission], 2004, p. 408) 
Preventing f uture ter rorist a ttacks in the United Sta tes poses a number of 
challenges as well as opportunities for today’s hom eland security professionals. 
Strengthening information and collaboration capabilities are paramount in supporting the 
country’s national p reparedness goals under the pillar of prevention. W ithin the District 
of Columbia, improving and standardizing th e methods to collect, document and analyze 




the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in s eeking to keep the community saf e. This 
same methodology can be used by law enforcem ent agencies nationwide to advance their 
intelligence operations.  
The current law enforcement philosophy pertaining to counter-terrorism espouses 
the be lief that the na tion’s s tate, local, tribal and federal officers pl ay an indispens able 
role in pre venting te rrorism. However, the majority of  law enf orcement ef forts in  
collecting intelligence have been archaic and inefficient in that the information collected 
is not adequately handled and passed on fo r review. Lik ewise, in  situation s wh ere 
intelligence is sufficiently analyzed, in many cases, it is not expediently transformed into 
a product that is relayed to the officers in the field who need it most. As the 9/11 
Commission noted when speaking to the im portance of in tegrated all-source analysis, 
“No one component holds all the relevant information” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 408).  
As standardization and co mmon m ethodology are critic al to the infor mation 
sharing process, a potential so lution that has been presente d by the Ma jor Cities Chief s 
Association is discussed in a recent white paper,  in which recommendations are made for 
remediation, including  the standa rdization and institu tionalization of  suspicious activity 
reports (SAR). This  recomm endation re garding use of SARs, if im plemented 
successfully, has the potentia l to address the current inadequacies and could provide the 
link between persons and/ or ac tivities with  a n exus to te rrorist acti vities. Furt hermore, 
adopting this tenet seeks to transition law enforcement officers from traditional response 
roles to active participants in preventi on (Major Cities Chiefs Association, 2008, p. 5).  
With over 830,000 police officers in teracting with communities on a daily basis, failing 
to capita lize on using these reso urces to pr oactively address terrorism  would be a 
monumental failure (Bureau of Justice Assistance [BJA], 2009). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This th esis will exam ine the  inad equacies of  the existing  inf ormation shar ing 
environment in the law enforcement community and seek to ameliorate these deficiencies 
through im plementing a program  to expand the capacity to collect, analyze and share 
information through standardized technologic al solutions. A coor dinated information 
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sharing effort will allow relevan t stakeh olders to acces s previo usly uncollected or 
inaccessible inform ation and will foster a collaborative, com prehensive information  
sharing environment. This thesis als o seeks to enhance domestic intellig ence collection 
by expanding beyond the law enforcem ent co mmunity. The prim ary research question 
that this thesis seeks to answer is: 
How can the intelligence community enhance homeland security through 
an extensive and standardized effort to amass and disperse information? 
The metric used to define enhance in this context refers to the preempting 
of future terrorist attacks through increasing the number of partners 
participating in the information sharing environment. 
In seeking to answer this question, this th esis research will al so address a second 
tier of questions including:  
1. What types of technology can be leveraged to enhance this process, ensure 
privacy and provide for the security of classified information?  
2. Where are  law enf orcement communitie s cu rrently f alling short in  th eir 
mission of collecting and dissem inating intelligence and  how can th ey 
improve these efforts by expanding their pool of resources? 
3. How can suspicious a ctivity reporting be i mplemented and custom ized to 
meet agency needs as well as tho se of the gr eater inf ormation sha ring 
environment?  
4. How can current hum an inte lligence (HUMINT) collectio n at th e loc al 
level b e augm ented by reach ing out bey ond the tradition al law 
enforcement community?  
5. How will c ommunity policing ef forts be im pacted by law enf orcements 
emerging focus on counterterrorism and information collection?  
6. What lessons can be learned from other countries a nd ou tside the la w 
enforcement realm pertaining to te chnology, organizational structure and 
information sharing th at can  succe ssfully be applied to im prove the 
information sharing environment in the United States?  
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the  fore word of the  National Intelligence Strategy published in 2005, the 
Director of National Inte lligence, John Negroponte, sp ecifically used the term 
“collaborative” in desc ribing the n ew approac h to nation al inte lligence (Of fice of the 
Director on National Intelligence). While much research has been done on the failures of 
intelligence and the need to change, there is less exploration into the proven remedies for 
these shortcomings. The Director of Nationa l Intelligence (DNI) further recognized that 
the domestic intelligence mission would be s ignificantly enhanced when state and local 
intelligence was combined with that of the intelligence community (Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, 2005).  
As the ne ed f or tr ansforming intelligence is ex plored in g reater depth  than th e 
research pertaining to solutions, the first question that th is literature review addresses is: 
Where are law enf orcement communities falling short in th eir mission of collecting and 
disseminating intelligence? Although the m ajority of the literature on shortcom ings was 
produced after September 11, in 1996, a Clint on administration commission on the roles 
and capabilitie s of  the United States in telligence community recog nized tha t “th e 
intelligence must be closer to those it serves” (Commission on the Roles and Capabilities 
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1996). In  a joint inquiry into  the intelligence 
community activities before and after the terrorist attacks of Septe mber 11, 2001, it was  
determined that the intellig ence co mmunities’ failure to c oordinate in formation in an 
adequate and timely manner was a critica l factor in their in ability to de tect and pre empt 
these events . The National Strategy for Homeland Security also  note d the need  for 
comprehensive inte lligence in the  law enf orcement community as p art of  its s trategic 
objectives (DHS, 2007). 
Beyond the collection and dissem ination of in telligence, it is also im portant to 
distinguish the dif ference between  inf ormation and inte lligence, as  inte lligence is 
essentially information that has been analyzed. As Gregory Treverton (2005, p. 17) points 
out in a Rand publication, “The need to reshap e analysis is dram atic. Current and future 
threats to the United States are glob al and adaptive, blurring distinctions between crime, 
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terrorism and war.”  This statem ent summarizes the m agnitude that analysis p lays in 
formulating patterns from information that is almost always incomplete.  
One of the challenge s in implementing change to rectif y this dilemma may lie in 
the organizational structures of law enforcem ent and intelligence agencies themselves. In 
her article “ Institutional Origins of  the 9/11 Intellig ence Fa ilure,” Am y Zegart (20 05) 
writes that governm ent agencies w ere not built  to adapt to change as they have “more 
constraints face m ore conflicting mission w ith less m anagerial discretion and fewer 
resources than private sector firms do” (p. 492). While she gives a number of examples as 
to how the situation has im proved to som e extent, she highlights the need to better 
understand the organizational weaknesses that are barriers to change. 
In char acterizing the u tility of  th e avai lable sub-liter ature to illum inate th e 
historical inadequacies of the intelligence sharing process, the majority of the literature is 
relatively recent, with  a substantial increase  subsequent to the terroris t attack s of 
September 11. W hile the literature ranges in the breadth of its scope, it is largely 
undisputed by even those who were criticized as playing a role in the breakdowns. There 
were two main sectors contributing too m uch of the research in this area. The first sector 
was government, who vigorously investigated intelligence failures through methods such 
as after action reports and congressional hearings. The second secto r was academ ia, 
through m ainly books and scholarly articles. Of  the literature cove red in this specific 
realm, the 9/11 Commission Report (9/11 Comm ission, 2004), which was written  after 
the review of m ore than 2.5 million pages of docum ents in seeking to discern how these  
events happened, is probably the m ost prom inent reco rd sh aping the d iscourse of  this 
subject. While it does a great service in docum enting the causes leading to the failures of 
the in telligence comm unity pe rtaining to this  specific ev ent, it fails to  give explicit 




D. VIABLE SOLUTIONS 
The next set of sub-literature on this topic addresses the question of how to 
address the se f ailures of  the intelligence community. More precis ely, this research  
pertains to the role of law enforcement within the intelligence community and the current 
deficiencies in the collection and dissem ination of information. S ince the attacks of 
September 11 there has been m uch m ore discu ssion in this  arena. The m ajority of  the 
literature was made up of journal articles and papers written by acad emia, government 
officials and police professionals seeking to correct th e problem . In search ing for 
methods to i mprove police response in  supporting the war on terrorism  through 
intelligence sharing, fusion centers have em erged as a regularly accepted m ethod of 
meeting this task. The Departm ent of Homela nd Security is curren tly seeking to f urther 
this process by creating a national network of fusion centers. This federally supported 
effort is designed to assist state, local and tribal law enforcement in standard izing 
practices and improving their capacity to both receive and share information. 
Fusion centers, such as the W ashington Regional Threat Analysis Center in 
Washington, D.C., seek to pro vide centr alized, m ulti-agency, infor mation and  
intelligence sharing, along with analysis of data to enha nce the operational effectiveness  
and efficiency of the myriad of agencies in the National Ca pital Region (NCR) in both 
crime prevention and hom eland security. As th ese cen ters continue to m ature, there is 
frequent discussion as to what constitu tes best practices in this dis cipline as well a s the 
materialization of virtual fusion centers.  
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is als o an emerging topic of discussion in the law  
enforcement community, which seeks to assi milate intelligence into the agency m ission. 
While many agencies are practicing this doc trine, it rem ains largely undefined in policy 
and will r emain this way until it is  recognized as more than philosophy and ingrained in 




An underlying philosophy of how intelligen ce fits into the operations of a 
law enforcem ent organization. Rather than being sim ply an inform ation 
clearinghouse that has been appended  to the organization, ILP provides  
strategic in tegration of  inte lligence into  the  overa ll m ission of  the 
organization. (Carter, 2007, p. 1) 
Groups with significant status in the la w enforcem ent community, s uch as the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police,  Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Police 
Foundation and the National Orga nization of Black Law E nforcement Executives have 
embraced this philosophy and recognize the value of intelligence in thwarting both crime 
and hom eland security  threats. In  a Bureau  of Justice Assistance docum ent, which 
discusses intelligence-led policing (2005), the va lue of patrol officers is recognized  as a 
vital source for the collection of information.  Likewise, this document highlights the fact 
that many law enforcem ent agencies lack th e guidance, p olicies and technical acu ity to 
further these objectives. 
While the sub-litera ture addressing opti ons for fixing the intelligence problem s 
offer a number of alternatives  that appear fundam entally acceded to, the im plementation 
of these alte rations are r elatively new or s till in the process of  being executed. As many 
programs and projects are still in the for mative stages, th ere are m any questions  that 
remain unanswered in this quest to benchmark what would be perceived as a best practice 
in the industry. In the domain of intelligence collection, for instance, there were a variety 
of opinions on who should be collecting intell igence. The Center for Policing Terrorism , 
for exam ple, perceives firefighters to be an integ ral tool in  the collection  and 
dissemination of terrorism related intelligence.  
In researching different fusion center con cepts, the core questions th at cam e to 
mind dealt with the analysis and dissem ination of infor mation. Specifically, one of the 
lingering issues is the role of the professional intelligence analyst in police work and the 
possibility of replacing police of ficers with in telligence experts.  W hile an entire thesis  
could be written on th is topic, it is widely agre ed that ana lytical stand ards are ne eded 
along with im proved training and enhanced technology to standardize the seam less 
exchange of infor mation. The National Info rmation Exchange M odel (NIEM) is one 
example of an effort that seeks to improve this electronic exchange through 
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standardization and consistency in vocabul ary and specifications. In an August 2009, 
meeting of  the Majo r Cities  Chief s Associat ions Inte lligence Commanders Conference, 
agencies su rveyed repo rted u sing a variety of analysts, from  contractors to injured 
officers who were serving in this capacity until their return to street duty.  
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research for this thesis will follow three approaches: a literature review explores 
smart practices being employed in the current infor mation sharing environm ent and 
policy that supports those prac tices. Secondly, case studies of  the suspicious activity 
reporting imple mentation and inform ation shar ing processes were conducted using the 
Los Angeles Police D epartment and th e Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Po lice 
Department. As the SA R initiative is in  its infancy, the Los Angeles Police Departm ent 
has the m ost com prehensive program in exis tence thus far—and will therefore be the 
primary agency exam ined. The DC Metropo litan Police  Departm ent im plemented its 
SAR initiative just p rior to the in auguration of President Barrack Oba ma and used SAR 
extensively during this event and pre-planni ng period. Thes e case studi es will illustrate 
the goals, p rocesses, ch allenges an d success es as a result of this inform ation sharing  
initiative and other technological tools that are currently in use.  
In using case studies as a research method for this proj ect, the foundational 
knowledge approach was used to provide a sy stematic technique for reviewing events, 
collecting and analyzing the relevant data  and repor ting re sults. This spe cific 
methodology was used as the analysis pertai ns to contem porary events, which included 
direct observation of the occurrences as well  as personal interviews with people involved 
in these incidents. In Robert K. Yin’s book (2008) on case study research, he prescribes 
the case study method when “how and why questions are to be the focus of the study” as 
was the case with this particular research project. 
As technology plays a vital role in this pr ocess, an analysis was also conducted of 
certain platform s that are currently  availab le to achieve the identified collection  and 
sharing goals of  the SAR program . An internal (DC Metropolitan Police Department)  
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comparison and critique of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) eGuardian and the 
program management information sharing environment (PM-ISE) was also evaluated.  
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
1. The Literature  
This thesis proposal will docum ent the efforts of the law enf orcement community 
to im plement a quality  solution to  a challe nge that has been vexing  the intellig ence 
community for many years. While this remains a work in progress, the literature involved 
is in the formative stages and will continue to evolve as this process expands. 
2. Future Research Efforts  
This proposal seeks to s timulate further discussion into sm art practices for 
information sharing  be tween loca l, state, tr ibal and federal agencies. Additionally, it 
provides future opportu nities to explore govern ment information sharing initiatives with 
the public and private sectors.  
3. Immediate Consumers  
The immediate benefit of this thesis is th at it will greatly enhance the amount of 
information being collected as well as the qua ntity of information accessible for analysis 
and subsequent dissem ination. Patrol offi cers, private sector employees and the 
community at large ( to nam e a f ew) will pl ay a progres sive role as  collecto rs of 
information. The intelligence community will also be benefactors as it will have access to 
an expanded pool of inform ation. Law en forcement, governm ent entities and the 
community at large will ultim ately be em powered to tak e on a p roactive po sture and 
collaboratively improve the nation’s ability to anticipate and preempt threats. 
4. Homeland Security Practitioners and Leaders Nationally  
As the gathering and distri bution of inform ation has b een largely inadeq uate and 
perplexing, this research will  provide options for both lo cal and national leaders to 
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address these issues. Furthermore, as stand ardization and consiste ncy are param ount in 
enriching this proc ess, this thesis  will prov ide policy guidance f or aiding  in  this 
progression.  
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II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT 
A. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing ( White House, 2007) prescribes 
that “Our su ccess in pre venting future attacks depends on o ur ability to  gather, analyze, 
and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to atta ck us, the ta ctics 
that they use, and the targets that they intend to attack.” While the terms information and 
intelligence are used interchangeably in many situations, it is important to distinguish the 
difference. Perhaps one of the si mplest definitions is provided by Dr. David Carter, who 
describes in telligence as infor mation that has been analyzed. From  a law enforcem ent 
perspective, he defines intelligence as follows:  
In the pures t sense, in telligence is the product of an analytic proces s that 
evaluates infor mation collected from  diverse sources, integrates the 
relevant information into a cohesive  package, and produces a conclusion 
or estimate about a criminal phenom enon by using the scientific approach 
to problem solving (i.e., analysis). In telligence, therefore, is a synergis tic 
product intended to provide m eaningful and trustworthy direction to law 
enforcement decision m akers about com plex crim inality, crim inal 
enterprises, criminal extremists and terrorists.” (Carter, 2002) 
In describing how the intelligence process works, m ost experts refer to a cycle, 
which essentially delineates a process path. At any stage in this cycle, the need may arise 
to go back to a previous stage for add itional inform ation or define additional 
requirements. Many models of  the intelligence cycle in clude between  five and  s even 
stages. The model portrayed below, which is used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
includes six stages commencing with requirements. The following overview describes the 
various stages of the intelligence process: 
1. Requirements  
Requirements consist of the type of information that the policy or decision makers 
need to help guide their decisions. For local  la w enf orcement, th is could include gang 
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activity or other relevant information that would be essential for protecting a community. 
On a national scale, the requirem ents would demarcate the information needed to protect 
the country. The Director of  Natio nal In telligence se ts the se requ irements ba sed on 
critical inf ormation and in particip ation w ith key stakeho lders su ch as the Atto rney 
General and Federal Bureau of Investigat ion. Questions pertaining to how much 
information should be collected and what prio rities exist frequently  rely on capabilities 
and rely on the policy maker to set.  
2. Planning and Direction 
As the in telligence cy cle is cons umer drive n, planning and direction are 
frequently seen as beginning and end stages as finished intelligence products often result 
in requirements for new infor mation. This stage of the cycle entails the m anagement of 
the process from  discerning what type of  infor mation is needed  to m eeting th e 
intelligence needs of the consumer.  
3. Collection 
Collection entails the am assing of raw inform ation that has not yet been 
processed and analyzed to create an intellig ence produ ct. There are a num ber of 
collection disciplines that are regularly referred to as the  INTs. These I NTs include the 
following: HUMINT: hum an intelligence,  in telligence de rived f rom hum an sources ; 
MASINT: m easurement and signatures intellig ence, provided through the analysis of 
physical attributes of target s; OSINT: open-source intelligence, publicly available 
information; SIGINT: signals intelligence, in formation obtained from data transmissions 
including communications, electronics and foreign instrumentation and IMINT/GEOINT: 
image intelligence/geospatial intelligence, information used to describe, depict and locate  
physical features and h uman activities taki ng place anyw here on earth. Each of these 
disciplines has obvious advantag es and disadvantages. Due to cost or complexity, m any 
of these wo uld be unav ailable to the majority of state, local and tr ibal law enfor cement 
agencies. A ctivities such as interviews and su rveillance are m ore hab itually utiliz ed at 
this level.  
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4. Processing and Exploitation  
Processing and Exploitation consists of translating th e raw information from a n 
array of sources into a format that is functional for the in telligence analysts. This process 
may include language translati on and the reduction in the volu me of da ta available for 
analysis.  
5. Analysis and Production 
The process  of converting the raw info rmation into an in telligence product is  
known as analysis and production. In this s tage, subjec t m atter ex perts (analy sts) 
evaluate the relevance and vera city of  the av ailable inf ormation in o rder to  cr eate an 
intelligence product an d m ake assum ptions pertaining to  potential inferences derived 
from their conclusions.  
6. Dissemination 
Dissemination is the  relatively standardized process that inv olves the m oving of 
the intelligence product from  the pr oducers to the consum ers. Agencies typically have a  
product line to handle the needs of the consum er they are preparing th e intelligence for. 
This would consist of products such as briefings, bulletins and longer-term estimates. The 
FBI for exam ple, dissem inates infor mation in  three standard formats: “Intelligence 
Information Reports (IIRs), FBI Intelligence Bulletins, and FBI Intelligence Assessments. 
FBI intelligence products are prov ided daily to the Attorney General, the President, and 
to customers throughout the FBI and in other ag encies” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 
[FBI], 2009). See Figure 1.  
 Figure 1.   FBI Intelligence Cycle (From FBI, 2009) 
While this  process m ay not be f lawless and m ay not provide a com plex m ulti-
dimensional overview,  it doe s a ccurately p ortray the essential in gredients o f the  
intelligence cycle. The g reater issue in this process seems to lie  in the dissem ination of 
the inte lligence produ ct. Additio nal hindran ces such a s the over- classification of 
intelligence products, structuring analytic t echniques for im proving intelligence analysis 
and f ailing to share intelligen ce with all relevant stak eholders r emain a continuing 
challenge. In March of 2009, the U.S. govern ment released a tradecraft prim er, which 
provides a f ormative overview of the analyt ic techniques. In May of 2009, the White 
House issued a press release to th e heads of executiv e d epartments and agencies in  





for increased transparency and provide for greater public disclosure of information. These 
documents represent the foundation for i mproving the intelligence and infor mation 
sharing process.  
B. THE CURRENT INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT 
While the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in November of 2002 
sought to remedy the complexities involved with  the lack of unity between an abundance 
of agencies  in pro tecting the United States, over six years later, there are a num ber of 
issues yet to be r esolved. From an intellig ence perspective,  the m ajor change that took 
place was the creation o f the Director of National Intelligen ce (DNI), which occurred in  
2004—subsequent to the release of the 9/11 Commission Report. Considered by many to 
be the largest intelligence restructuring in the United States since World War II, the DNI 
was essentially deemed the head of national intelligence.  
The impetus for the In telligence Reform and Te rrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
was “the concern that agencies did not share intelligence well” (Lowenthal, 2006). Unlike 
the director of central inte lligence preced ing him , the DNI  is no t connected to  any 
specific agency but has control ov er all of them and is t asked with insuring th at the 
agencies are sharing intelligence thr oughout the intellig ence community. W ith 16 
agencies comprising the U.S. intelligence com munity (IC), one of  the challenges for the 
DNI is to  work throug h som e of  the exis ting terr itorial is sues th at in hibit opera tional 
effectiveness. The executive bran ch agencies and organizations that co mprise the IC are 
responsible for providin g intelligence that is necessary for th e protection of the natio nal 
security of the United S tates. The intelligence they collect is im parted to the Pres ident, 
National Security Council, Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as other officials of 
the executive branch of government. The government consequently uses this intellig ence 
to guide policy on natio nal security issues to in clude military actions a nd international 
negotiations.   
Another effort aim ed at im proving intel ligence sharing  in the Unite d States  
involves the expansion of Joint Terrorism  Task Forces (JTTFs). Initi ally created in 1980 
(New York City) with an e mphasis on crime, these task forces are now operating in 100 
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cities throughout the United States and play  a major role in tracking dow n leads relating 
to terrorism. W orking through the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, these groups 
combine the resou rces of federal, state,  lo cal and tribal law enforcem ent to 
comprehensively investigate all ac ts related to terror. Am ong the successes claim ed by 
JTTFs is the breaking up of cells on Am erican soil to include the “Lackawanna Six,” the 
“Portland Seven” and the Northern Virginia  Jihad. In W ashington, D.C., members of the 
Metropolitan Police Department assigned to the JTTF regularly respond to bom b threats, 
white powder calls and incidents with a nexus to terrorism, while a lso handling an a rray 
of cases to  include  th ose with ties to international te rrorism. Fusion centers  and 
suspicious a ctivity repo rts (SARs)  are also  adding to  this list of  initiatives  and  are  
described in subsequent chapters of this paper.  
While the efficacy of JTTFs can be debate d, one of the clear im pediments is that 
it would b e im possible for every  law enforcem ent agency to hav e representation . 
Therefore, g reater efforts are required to sh are inform ation with agencies that are not  
currently included. Likewise, w ith tightening budgets at all levels of governm ent, many 
state, local and tribal leaders are evaluating the performance of task force members to see 
if they could better be utilized for local functions.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPANDING THE COLLECTION OF 
INFORMATION AND THE NEED FOR MEGACOMMUNITIES 
With the decentra lization of  many crim inal and terror ist e ntities, the dom estic 
intelligence capacity of the law e nforcement community should ev aluate its current 
practices and consider embracing ch ange in ord er to keep u p with the predicam ent that 
devolution from  an organization to a netw ork poses.  S haring inform ation betwee n 
agencies, both horizontally and vertically are essential as local, national and international 
borders do not apply to these expanding crim inal networks. Expanding networks thus 
require the law enf orcement community to us e sim ilar ar rangements to addres s this 
quandary and shift from traditional polici ng paradigm s. Likewise, law enforcem ent 
networks must consider expanding beyond the law enforcement community to cast out a  
virtual net that will include an array of both public and priv ate sector agencies—as well 
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as the community at large—in an effort to  enhance the volu me of infor mation collected. 
According to Secre tary Napolita no in her  conf irmation statem ent, “The f ederal 
government can’t do this alone” (Napolitano, 2009). This same principle may apply to all 
levels of governm ent. As the private sector  has responsibility fo r roughly 85 percent of 
the nation’s critical infrastructure, partnerships are not only needed, but are critical.  This 
network includes facilities such as hospitals , laborato ries, chem ical plants and p ower 
companies. The individuals responsible for ha ndling sensitive m aterials must be trained 
to identify and report suspicious behavior or purchases that require circumspection.  
Counterterrorism strategies, including information sharing initiatives, may require 
innovative approaches that call for greater inte gration and holistic leadership to look at 
the big picture as opposed to working within th e confines of agency walls. As stated on 
President Barack Obama’s White House Home Page (2009), “The information we collect 
must be analyzed as  well as  shared, and we must invest in our analy tic capabilities and 
our capacity to share in telligence across all levels of governm ent.” Beyond the law 
enforcement community and governm ental organizations, both the business comm unity 
and civil society have im portant roles in keeping our nation safe. In the book 
Megacommunities (Gerencser, M., Kelly, M., Napolita no, F. & Van Lee, R., 2008) this  
interdependent approach is explored in depth and offers a com pelling argum ent for 
greater co llaboration to  address  increasing ly complex issues. Form er President George 
W. Bush proclaimed the importance of information sharing in a 2003 sp eech in which he 
stated: 
All across our country we’ll be able to tie our terrorist information to local 
information banks so that the f ront line of  def eating te rror becom es 
activated and real, and those are the local law enforcem ent officials. We 
expect them to be a part of our e ffort; we must give the m the tools 
necessary so they can do their job.” (Department of Justice, 2008)   
While this statem ent underscores the real ization that the federal governm ent has 
to work beyond traditional boundaries, the law enforcement comm unity as a whole 
should consider the benefits of for ming collaborative information sharing networks with 
both public and private partners to attain a more com prehensive depiction of existing 
threats. This m egacommunity approach to combating terrorism through a broadening of 
communities and organizations espo uses the belief that a change in orien tation is needed 
as no individual agency or community can achieve this goal on its own.  
As hom eland secu rity is a shared  issue in which all com munities ha ve both  a 
stake, as well as som e sense of urgency, the foundation exists to  create and sustain a 
viable cond uit. W ith all groups w orking in the sam e space and req uired to  balance  
decision m aking responsibilities as well as roles, th ey op erate and m aintain what is  
referred to as a “dynamic tension” that is channeled and sustained through a cross-culture 
dialogue. The concept of dynamic tension is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.   The Dynamic Tensions Inherent in a Megacommunity (From Gerencser, M., 
Kelly, M., Napolitano, F. & Van Lee, R. 2009).  
One of the challenges in m aintaining this dynam ic tension is that no one sector  
should dominate as a constant state of negotia tion needs to take place. W ith government 
at the forefront of this effort, leadership fr om this segm ent needs to be cognizant of the 
requisite to relinqu ish p ower in ord er to m aintain the b alance. This do es not m ean an  
abdication of responsibility for spearheading this  relationship, as “initiators” are essential 
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to put im plementation processes in place. In stead, it requires th at the initiators be 
prepared to relinqu ish their le adership roles a s the community com es togethe r. Ju st as  
“Starfish system s,” as described by Br afman a nd Beckstrom (2006) in their book The 
Starfish and the Spider, work together as a network; there is no centralized hierarchy and, 
thus, no president or C EO of the m egacommunity. This seem ingly chaotic environm ent 
allows for unhindered innovation and encourag es creativity that would otherwise be 
muted in a traditional hierarchy.  
Within these “m egacommunities,” there ar e f ive elem ents iden tified that a re 
deemed critical and needed to move this strategy forward:  
1. Tri-Sector Engagement includes the civil so ciety elem ent, which is  
frequently m issing in conventional pub lic-private partnerships. From an 
information sharing pe rspective, this would include education and strong 
outreach to the community.  
2. Overlapping in Vital Interests pertains to  the m utual inter est that 
individual communities have in  a particular issue, which compels them to 
work in a m egacommunity environm ent for the common good. As 
homeland security permeates all three sectors, this common interest exists, 
but must receive a heightened sense of urgency.  
3. Convergence describes the m utual comm itment to action that all 
community members must maintain as a goal.  
4. Structure portrays the necessary guidelines  that enable the group to 
congregate around essential interests in  which there is mutual overlap. 
This structu red governance will set standards for the netw ork to follow, 
and provide for the technology and resources to meet those standards.  
5. Adapatability refers to the ability f or the three sectors to be both f lexible 
and balanced in order to meet the needs of the other participants as well as 
their individual group requirements. (Gerencser et al., 2008)  
Changing leadership styles to meet the demands of today and in the future is also 
a consideration for i mmediate as w ell as long term  success. W ithin this fra mework, a  
leadership definition that meets this classification is what is known as “m eta-leadership.” 
As described by authors Marcus, Dorn and Henderson (2005), m eta-leaders are people 
“who are able to inf luence and  accom plish such collaboration of effort across  
organizations—multijurisdictional, multiagency  and public/private.” W ith the em erging 
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threats of terrorism and asymmetric m ethods for carrying out attacks, meta-leaders must  
be responsive to their organi zation as well as the comm unity at la rge. According to the 
authors, “T hese leade rs connect with, inf luence, and integrate the ac tivities of  diverse  
agencies, thereby motivating interaction, enhancing communication, and engendering the 
sort of cross-organizational confidence necessary for effective terrorism preparedness and 
emergency response” (Howitt & Piangi, 2003).   
In order to im plement this strategy of  creating a m egacommunity to am end the 
existing information sharing process and preem pt future acts of terror, th e five elem ents 
listed above m ust all take shape w ith each  sector taking part and assigning capable 
leaders to the various roles. As this network has many interactive elements and relies on a 
dynamic synergy it can be classified as a “complex system.” As Snowden and Boone 
(2007) write, “Com plexity is poised to help current and future leaders m ake sense of 
advanced technology, globalization,  intricate markets, cultural change, and m uch more.” 
Effectively leading within a com plex contex t r equires law  enf orcement to: eng age in 
interactive communications, establish rules for the group, encourage “attractors”—to gain 
and encourage m omentum—encourage deba te and diversity and manage starting 
conditions, while monitoring for emergence of new opportunities.  
With the major law enf orcement entities adop ting the su spicious ac tivity repor t 
process to improve the comm unication betw een law enf orcement agencies, the initia l 
steps are in place to dup licate efforts within the other sectors of the m egacommunity. In 
order to maintain trust, it is cruc ial to ensure  that all partners  are well-educated as to  the 
goals, objectives and responsibilit ies that each party bears and to ensure that all privacy  
policies are being strictly followed. Failing to do so, could result in a retreat or complete  
withdrawal from  this network. On the contra ry, achieving this goa l c an result in  a n 
immensely powerful counterterrori sm tool, which has  the potential to d ramatically alter 
the safety of the nation.  
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D. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN ENHANCING THE INFORMATION 
SHARING ENVIRONMENT 
With over 18,000 trib al, state and local la w enforcement agencies comm itted to 
the homeland security m ission, one of the reas ons customary practices in collecting and 
sharing inform ation have proved ineffectiv e is the im proper or under-utilized use of 
technology. Beyond the com plexities of inform ation classifications  and the lack of 
personnel with adequate clearances, archaic systems have impeded the ability to get 
information to the app ropriate pla tform f or analysis. L ikewise, once inform ation is  
converted into an intelligence product, disse mination methods are often not capable of 
reaching vast amounts of relevant personnel, who may have the ability to take preven tive 
action. As the Am erican system of govern ment empowers non-federal law enforcem ent 
agencies to take responsibility for the safety of their individual communities, it is equally 
important that they are equipped with the tools and knowledge needed to accomplish that 
mission.  
In the inform ation sharing dom ain, there ar e a num ber of unclass ified as well as 
secret level and top secre t—sensitive com partmented inf ormation (TS/SCI) leve l 
computer systems. At the unclas sified level, many law enforcem ent agencies now h ave 
access to resources such as the Hom eland Security Inform ation Network (HSIN), which 
is the Dep artment of  Hom eland Security ’s network for both developing threat 
information and distributing warnings and th reat intelligence. Al so popular amongst law 
enforcement is Law En forcement Online (LE O), which is used by  law enforcem ent 
professionals as well as  the Federal Bureau  of Investigation to  communicate and s hare 
data. The Central Inte lligence Agency (CIA),  State Dep artment and Departm ent of  
Defense all maintain unclassified networks as well.  
At the secret level and top secret—sen sitive compartmented information level—
there are 15  separate classifi ed computer system s being used  by th e myriad of ag encies 
and include networks for a range of consum ers to include congress (CapNet), contractors 




fax networks in place for handling  sensitiv e or class ified inform ation. Secure term inal 
equipment (STE’s), for exam ple, allow for secure conversations to take place via 
telephone. 
While the intelligence  community has evolved from  a “need to kno w” to a 
“responsibility to provide” ph ilosophy, this volum inous list of independent networks 
illustrates the need f or greate r integration of  existing sys tems and a m ore collaborative 
information sharing strategy. Past debacles ex emplify the fact that no single agency has 
an accurate portray al of a real or perceived threat and that all agencies require acces s to 
additional sources  to  provide  a tru ly co mprehensive analys is. Likewise,  th e 
overwhelming amount of state,  local and federa l agencies have no access to the m ajority 
of these sys tems, which precludes th em from obtaining an all-inclusive awareness of the 
situation as  well. This chapte r addresse s the resea rch question : Where are law 
enforcement communities falling short in their mission of collecting and disseminating 
intelligence and how can they improve these efforts by expanding their pool of 
resources?  
Fusion centers have helped to fill som e of the existing gaps, as well as “writing 
for relea se” to the rele vant consumers. Additionally, fusion centers have addressed the 
research question pertaining to the effort s to  im prove inf ormation collec tion a nd 
dissemination through expanding the pool of resources. However, there are still voids that 
remain largely unf illed within the e xisting s tructure and a re due prim arily to th e sheer 
volume of agencies. In this new inf ormation age, there are wide-ranging technologies 
available to  enhance cu rrent p rocesses and exponentially improve the possibilities  tha t 
are realistically attainable.     
Achieving this v ision is the challenge for homeland security leaders at all levels. 
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano has rem arked that it is a  priority f or her agency to  
increase the exchange of information with state and local governments. Speaking before a 
House Committee on Homeland Security, she further stated, “How do we  make sure that 
we have integrated intelligence with  state and local officials and are sharing inform ation 
adequately and on a real-tim e basis? Tha t is o ne area tha t will be a m ajor focus…As a 
former governor and state attorney general, I appreciate that need” (Napolitano, 2009).  
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III. TRANSITIONING TO INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
A. THE EXPANDING ROLE OF FUSION CENTERS 
Beyond the transitions taking place on the fe deral level, there has also been a  
significant amount of progress taking place between the federal gov ernment and law 
enforcement at the state, local and tribal levels.  The National Strategy for Information 
Sharing (White House, 2007) called for “a nati onal inf ormation sharing capability 
through the establishment of a national network of fusion centers.” Fusion centers, which 
can be d efined as “an effective an d effici ent m echanism to exchang e inform ation and  
intelligence, maximize resources, s treamline operations, and im prove the ability to f ight 
crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources,” ( Department of Justice,  
2003) provide a one-stop location for retrieving vital intellig ence to support the needs of 
the community.  These fusion centers, which ar e run by state and local governm ents, are 
continuing to evolve and sta ndardize their capa bilities, while sim ultaneously creating a  
formal apparatus for sharing information between the federal intelligence community and 
state/local/tribal governments.  Secretary Na politano told a House Panel in February of 
2009, that DHS needs to better utilize inform ation from  fusion centers  as part of their 
counterterrorism efforts. (Napolitano, 2009). 
With the empower ment of local g overnment to take a se at at th e pr overbial 
intelligence table, concerns pertaining to pr ivacy and civ il liber ties we re consequ ently 
recognized and continue to be addressed. In 2004, President Bush and the U.S. Congress 
established the Inform ation Sharing Environm ent ( ISE) “ for the sh aring of terrorism 
information in a m anner consisten t with natio nal secu rity and with applicab le legal 
standards re lating to pr ivacy and c ivil lib erties” (Intelligen ce Refor m and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004). The sam e act that established the ISE also established the 
position of “Program  Manager” to oversee this  process. Since this tim e, fusion centers 
have evolved to encom pass a wide array of capabilities with many considering or taking 
on an “all crim es/all hazards” appro ach. Beyond providing a m echanism for the 
collection, analysis an d dissem ination of in formation/intelligence, fusion centers  are 
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showing prom ise in advancing efforts to de tect, investigate, re spond and prevent both 
criminal and terrorist acts. W hile their suc cess remains largely unproven, current efforts 
aimed at establishing b aseline capabilities an d developing standardized fusion center 
guidelines is a step in the right direct ion in seeking to benchm ark exceptional 
applications. An increased f ocus on collectio n has been, and will continue to  be,  
paramount in furthering the aspect of prev ention. In a B ureau of Justice Assistance 
publication entitled Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and 
Intelligence in a New Era (2006, p. 4), it is recommended th at “fusion centers adhere to 
these guidelines and integrate the key elements of each guid eline to the fullest exten t, in 
order to enhance information and intelligence sharing.” 
Although these centers are in their relative infancy, incr emental strides continue 
to be m ade in breaking down the barriers betw een the federal IC a nd s tate, local, and 
tribal agencies. In a h earing befo re a Senate Comm ittee on Intellig ence Reform i n 
January, 2007, DC Poli ce Chief Ca thy Lanier recognized fusion centers as a m eans for 
improving infor mation flow between local governments and their federal partners. 
(Lanier, 200 7) Form er DHS Chief  Intelligen ce Officer Charles E. Allen also notes  the 
utility of fusion centers, calling them a “key conduit” for sharing federal infor mation and 
intelligence down to the  lo cal level. (Allen, 2007).  Under the current system  in place 
within th e United Sta tes, the coop erative f ederalism that exists  can p ose a m yriad of 
obstacles in the realm  of information sharing—only some of which have been addressed 
by innovations such as fusion centers. Accordi ng to the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(2004), there are over 830,000 law enforcem ent officers in the United States, and nearly 
18,000 separate state and local la w enforcement agencies. As it would be im possible for 
every agency to have a person dedicated to  a fusion center—or even dedicated to  an 
intelligence function—smaller jurisdictions f ace even greater challenges gaining access 
to relevant intelligence. 
While the larger m etropolitan areas th roughout the Un ited States  m ay be 
considerably m ore attra ctive to ter rorists due to the critical in frastructure and key 
resources located within their jurisdictions, much of the planning (as demonstrated by the  
9/11 attacks ) can take place in su burbs or rural areas w ith less con nectivity to  the 
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intelligence community. This illustra tes th e need for even the s mallest of police 
departments to seek out and m aintain some type of intelligence capacity. The availability 
and access to curren t technologies make this potential ordeal a possib ility for even those 
agencies in the most remote areas of the country.  
The proliferation of fusion centers, su ch as the W ashington Regional Threat 
Analysis Center (W RTAC) in Washington, D. C., have been integral in providing 
centralized, multi-agen cy, inf ormation and in telligence sha ring to enha nce oper ational 
effectiveness and efficiency to the m yriad of agencies in the National Capital Region 
(NCR) in both crime prevention and homeland security. This is evident in  the increasing 
number of agencies as signing analysts to participate in the center. The 15 analysts 
currently embedded include personnel from Metro Tran sit, U.S. Capitol Police,  DC 
Department of Health, DC Fire and Em ergency Medical S ervices, FBI, Court Services 
and Offende r Supervision Agency and Montgo mery Count y Police. The distribution of 
open source products has expanded beyond the U. S. to eight foreign countries, and has 
grown to serve approxim ately 30,000 readers. (WRTAC, 2009). In order to increase the 
effectiveness of this center, and fu sion cente rs nationwide, greater strides need to be  
taken in the collection and analysis of info rmation. If law enforcem ent seeks to truly 
embrace a philosophy of intelligen ce-led polici ng, which attem pts to provide strategic 
integration of intelligen ce into the m ission of the organization, the implem entation of 
SAR may be one of the mechanisms for achieving this.  
Beyond the institutionalization of counterte rrorism in the law enforce ment realm, 
the 72 fusion centers currently operating in the United States have the potential to play a 
vital role in  addressing m ajor crim e issues . In a recent add ress by Homeland Security 
Secretary Janet Napolitano, she stated in prepared remarks:  
At the Departm ent of Hom eland Secu rity, information and intellig ence 
sharing is a top priority, and fusion centers play an im portant role  in 
helping to make that happen. In the worl d we live in today, it’s c ritical for 
federal, state, local and tribal entities to know what the others are doing so  
each can operate effectively and efficiently. (Napolitano, 2009) 
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B. THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
With the burgeoning technology in this po st-9/11 world, m any state, local and 
tribal police  agencie s n ationwide a re m aking a logic al tr ansition to intelligen ce-led 
policing or m aking greater use of  intelligen ce f or police  opera tions. Inte lligence-led 
policing is defined as: 
A business model and m anagerial ph ilosophy where data analysis and 
crime intelligence are pivotal to an o bjective, decision-making framework 
that facilitates crim e and problem  reduction, disruption and prevention 
through both strategic m anagement and effective enforcem ent strategies 
that target prolific and serious offenders. (Ratcliffe, 2008).  
As this tran sition take s place, the g oal is not to repla ce tradition al co mmunity 
policing efforts, but to engage police o fficers to take on a m ore active role as  
“preventers” of crime—rather than mere responders. Just as Chief William Bratton of the 
Los Angeles Police Department implemented Wilson’s Broken Windows Theory (Wilson 
& Kelling, 1982) in New York City to com bat crime when he served as the chief there, 
the intelligence-led policing philosophy has the potential to transform police departments 
into proactive counter-terrorism agencies.     
In order for any police agency working in a democratic society to be successful, it 
is im perative that law enf orcement have the r espect and  trust of  th e communities it 
serves. This is why community policing plays such a vital role in law enforcement efforts 
to thwart future acts of terror. W ith over 830,000 police officers working in the 18,000 
plus departments across the country, (Bureau of  Justice Assistance, 2009) there is no one 
better suited to have the relationships and finger on the pulse than these assets. Sir Robert 
Peele makes an articulate assessm ent about the role of the police in his statem ent, “The 
police are the public and the public are the pol ice; the police being only m embers of the 
public who are pa id to give f ull time attention to duties w hich are incumbent on every 
citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence” (R. Peel, n.d., from Law Dog 
files). This theory reinforces that both the police and the community share a m utual role 
in the prev ention of crime and that som e version of community policing will f orever be 
incorporated into currently practiced policing methods.   
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State, local and tribal law (SLT) enfor cement agencies are cognizant of  the fact 
that they cannot rely on th e federal governm ent alone to  collect and dissem inate 
information and/or  inte lligence; Hence, the  bur geoning nu mber of  f usion cen ters and 
JTTF’s (Joint Terrorism Task Forces) that have emerged. While these projects are still in 
the form ative stages,  they have served well to enhance the inform ation sharing 
capabilities between SLT agencies and the federal government. The ability of non-federal 
police agencies to obtain  information from community members is critical to the success 
of preem ptive counterterrorism  efforts and ev ery law enforcem ent agency in Am erica, 
regardless of its size, has a role in this national effort.  
1. Introduction and Importance of Community Policing 
Whether it is an attack on a school by an  isolated individual, a hom egrown or 
even foreign-borne threat, the rea lity is that te rrorist or c riminal plots a re most likely to 
be detected at the grass roots level—in the communities in which they are planned. With 
strong conn ections to  the comm unities th rough continu ed community policing ef forts, 
local law enforcement officers are well suited  to discern intellig ence that will u ltimately 
preempt an attack. Even foreign-born terrorists have shown an effort to assimilate into the 
communities in which they live in o rder to remain inconspicuous. In communities where 
law enforcement officers are well k nown and trusted, citizens are more likely to re port 
suspicious behavior and approach law enforcement to make that notification.  
As police departm ents transition to take  on proactive roles as collectors of 
information, one of the ancillary challenges becomes wha t to do with the information 
they have collected. Putting classified information into a product that can be disseminated 
to the officer on the street rem ains a complex issue. Just as the 9/11 Commission Report 
identified the federal government’s failure to connect the dots, it is equally important that 
information obtained at the state/local/tri bal levels be passed along, analyzed and 
transformed into actionable intelligence. In the realm of suspicious activity, it can also be 
argued that there is an active ro le for every American to be aware of what constitutes  
suspicious activ ity/behavior—and to repo rt it when it happens. As police agencies 
develop intelligence-based collection models, it is im perative that community m embers, 
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and both private and public stakeholders, be actively engaged in this information sharing 
process. Pa rtnerships with the co mmunity will f orever be an integ ral par t of  any 
successful p olicing s trategy as law enforcem ent alone does not have the resources to 
handle the vast amount of crime and disorder issues that inflict many neighborhoods.  
Community-oriented policing (or som e vers ion thereof) h as been the p ervasive 
policing philosophy in the United States for ne arly three decades. Mission statements 
have changed over this period to reflect th e importance of  maintaining the respect and 
trust of the community and building strong  relationships between  th e police an d th e 
communities they se rve. One of  the m ajor initia tives tha t comm enced in the U nited 
Kingdom in the late 1990s, which is now bei ng studied and im plemented in parts of the 
United States, is the philosophy of intelligence -led policing. While th ere are a variety of  
definitions used to describe what constitute s intelligence -led polic ing, in re lation to 
community policing, the Bureau  of Justice Assistance describes it as follows: 
“Intelligence-led po licing is a collaborativ e en terprise b ased on im proved inte lligence 
operations and community-oriented policing and problem  solving, which the field has 
considered beneficial f or m any years” ( 2005). Re maining dom inant in community 
policing ef forts are the  requisite c itizen i nput, includ ing tailo red po licing f or lo cal 
communities and th e expansion of p olice functions beyond crim e fighting to encom pass 
order maintenance and preemptive crime suppression actions.  
Historically, community polic ing in  Am erica has evolved from  sim ple patrol 
studies to Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) “Broken Windows Theory,” which focused on the 
importance of  police  in  prote cting communitie s in additio n to indiv idual comm unity 
members. In doing so, they highl ighted the role o f police in preventing crime rather than 
just reacting to it. Goldst ein’s (1996), “problem -oriented policing” philosophy took 
community policing to the ne xt level through the active involvement of community 
members in assessing problem s and custom izing a respo nse to  addressing the issue.  
Problem-oriented (Bureau of Justice Assi stance, 2009) policing (PO P) continues to 
incorporate the community as an active part ner in working jointly with law enf orcement 
to design solutions to identified problems as well as ranking the orde r of problems to be 
addressed.   
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CompStat, which is a police m anagement tool that or iginated in New York City, 
(Henry, n.d.) continued the evolution of th ese m odels and all genres continue to 
incorporate intelligen ce aspect s th at illustrate  th e com patibility of  community policing 
programs and intellig ence-led p olicing. Th e successes achieved  through these 
philosophies have resulted in both enhanced community relations as well as safer 
communities.  
2. Pros and Cons of Maintaining a Focus on Community Policing and 
Incorporating Intelligence-Led Policing 
Due to the  sm all size  of  m ost Am erican police departm ents, it m ay not be 
practical for every  agen cy to  have dedicated  in telligence o fficers and/or analysts.  Yet 
each agency  does have a role to p lay in national in telligence operatio ns and has th e 
capacity to incorporate som e level of intelligence-led policing strategy. Am ong these 
strategies include: m odification of m ission st atements, adapting in telligence policies, 
participating in inf ormation sha ring with state,  local, triba l and f ederal par tners and 
ensuring th at leg al saf eguards are  m aintained in order to protect civil liberties and 
privacy. While altering policies and adapting to new ideas can be extremely burdensom e, 
the positive s of  m odifying inte lligence st rategies far outweigh the encum brance of 
embracing this change. Emerging technologies allow law enforcement agencies to link to 
national intelligence databases through technology solutions and dedicated personnel can 
be assigned  to position s as intellig ence lia isons. These res olutions a llow agencies  that 
cannot staff fusion centers, Joint Terrorism  Task Forces or othe r federal operations 
centers to b oth re lay in formation to  the re levant autho rities and rece ive inte lligence in  
return. Figure 3 represents th e “continuum of imple mentation values of inte lligence-led 
policing” a nd illus trates the need f or extern al resourc es to advance their in telligence 
capacity.  
 Figure 3.   Continuum of Implementation Variables of ILP (From Carter, 2007) 
In order f or police of ficers to tra nsition f rom their tra ditional roles of  f irst 
responders to being active collectors of infor mation, it is essential that they are actively 
engaged and working in close partnerships with the communities they serve. The primary 
dilemma this new tra nsition pro mulgates is  the retention of  public tru st while  
encouraging community m embers to provide information about suspicious activities 
occurring in their neighbor hoods and potentially by their ne ighbors. With fusion centers 
and intelligence-led policing efforts mischaracterized by certain civil liberties groups and 
uninformed m embers of the public as secret ive intellig ence gathering and data m ining 
centers, great efforts need to be m ade to ensure transp arency and compliance with  all 
regulations pertaining to pr ivacy and civil liberties. Ex ecutive level support am ongst 
agency heads is also essential in changing the culture of the organization to inculcate 
intelligence into th e daily m ission of  the depar tment. Once the comm itment has been 
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 actively employ both the private and pub lic sectors as functional partners in this 
effort.  
ic is, the better equipped it will be to provide 
informa
r and m ust also deal with individual 
agency policies, culture shifts and privacy laws.  
3. Considerations 
made to thi s process, m embers at all leve ls of the agency m ust receive trainin g on 
criminal intellig ence. C onsequently, efforts m ust expand b eyond the law enforcem ent 
realm to
Innovative strategies such as anonymous tip lines, text m essaging programs and 
alert systems now provide the public with real -time crime information and the ability to 
relay inform ation to l ocal law enforcem ent partners with  increas ing ease. Lists ervs, 
which are forum s that transm it messages to a subscribed group vie e-m ail, also provide 
individual c ommunity m embers with the capa city to com municate directly with patrol 
officers assigned to their particular nei ghborhoods and further build the relationship 
through open two-way communication. Solid community partnerships will further enable 
the police to  educate the public about activities that comprise suspicious and/or criminal 
behavior. The more knowledgeable the publ
tion on potentially illegal activity.   
Applying intelligence-led policing strategies to community policing practices may 
significantly enhance th e effectiveness of la w enforcement in expanding the am ount of  
information collected f or analysis and subs equent dissem ination. Beyond the realm  o f 
crime, the expansion of  terror ist targe ting to an array of so ft targets including 
transportation, public health, financial ins titutions, energy, telecomm unications, an d a 
myriad of addition al u nconventional infras tructures furth er illu strates the need  for  
increased team work in gather ing and sharing information. Just as law enforcement bears 
risk in expanding its infor mation sharing effo rts, these po licies also impact all p artner 
agencies, who are p articipating in  this end eavo
Based upon the need f or greater collabor ation with communities and the m any 
public and private partners th at work clo sely with law enforcem ent, executives  m ay 
consider expanding upon existing comm unity policing practices to am eliorate this issue 
of underutilized HUMINT. Intelligence-led policing as defined by the Manhattan 
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y policing will rem ain a funda mental practice of 
effective police organizations.  
C. IS: WHAT AMERICA CAN LEARN FROM 
THE UNITED KINGDOM  
oing so, the Departm ent of Hom eland Security brought together over 180,000 persons  
Institutes Center for P olicing Terrorism  (2006) provides the opportunity for all law 
enforcement agencies (regardless of size) with the ability to assume effective intelligence 
operations that can be equally applied to both crime fighting and counterterrorism efforts. 
Opportunities now exist for law enforcem ent agencies at the state, lo cal and tribal levels 
to f urther their  co llaborative ef forts in in stitutionalizing inte lligence-led policing 
practices and expand the use of suspicious activity reporting processes beyond the police 
department to both public and private pa rtners. Future research m ay explore the 
effectiveness of assigning state,  local and trib al law enforcement agencies to play a lead 
role in regional fusion efforts as well  as the benefits of staffing both JTTF and national 
operations centers. If not prac tical due to the size or reso urces of the agency, one option 
is to have a dedicated person, who can liaison to ensure that vital inform ation is being 
shared. Advancing contem porary community policing ef forts to f it this  need will a llow 
police agencies nationwide to bolster their efforts in defending communities against both 
crime and terror ism. This chap ter conf irms the role  of  comm unity in answering  the  
research question: How will community policing efforts be impacted by law enforcements 
emerging focus on counterterrorism and information collection? As law enforcem ent 
agencies take on a greater ro le in counterterrorism  effort s and agencies becom e more 
reliant on intelligence,  comm unit
COMPARATIVE ANALYS
The f ailures of  the American inte lligence community to prevent th e terro rist 
attacks of Septem ber 11, 2001 are well documen ted and rem ain fresh on the m inds of 
intelligence professionals. Since that time, many efforts have  been undertaken to correct 
these deficiencies to in clude th e creation of fusion centers and Joint Terror ism Tas k 
Forces. The Hom eland Security Act of 2002 e stablished the Department of Homeland 
Security in  order  to  “provi de the unifying core for th e vast national network of 












from 22 separate agencies into a co hesive entity. In am algamating these organizations, 
the President sought to reali gn what was 
rnment activities” (DHS, 2009).   
Among the com plex challenges hindering th e information sharing process in the 
United States is the sheer volume of state, local, tribal and federal agencies that comprise 
and/or interact with the intelligence community. As relationships are integral for e
 of information, the multitudes of agencies alone pose daunting obstacles. 
In the United Kingdom , there were also a num ber of m odifications m ade post 
September 11 which impacted both the intelligence agencies as well as the police. The 
transfer of m any cri minal ju stice centric accou ntabilities from the Hom e Office to the 
newly created Ministry of Justice allowed fo r the Hom e Office to put greate r focus on 
intelligence gathering, count er terrorism  and substantiv e police operations. A newly 
created Office for Security and Cou nter-Terrorism (OSCT) was also created to m anage 
the operations of the H ome Office. In th e realm  of inform ation sharing, the United 
Kingdom has significantly fewer princip al intelligence ag encies and law enforcem ent 
organizations. Laws i
nd detention.  
While there  have been  argum ents f or the cre ation of  a dom estic in telligence 
agency in the United States, which would be com parable to the M I5 in the United 
Kingdom, this analysis  will focus on the United Kingdom ’s intellig ence-led po licing 
efforts and the sharin g of dom estic inform ation between the law enforcem ent and 
intelligence comm unities within the existing  organiza tional stru ctures. Consequently,  
recommendations will be proffered for in corporating the m ost e
ed through this comparative analysis into the American model.  
The tragic events of Septem ber 11, 2001, ha d a profound i mpact on m any 
countries beyond the United States,  includ ing the United Kingdom . While the Britis h 
have a long history in dealing with domestic terrorism, much of which dates back to the 
early 1900s, this specific occurrence resulted in an increased focus on Muslim extremism. 
It should be noted that the focus on international terrorism did not occur subsequent to 
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ut both interviews and IT  research  that often prove critical in 
bolsteri
government, which is based 
upon as
in the United States) and issuing warnings. According to the 
UK’s intelligence Web site:  
 
this attack, as the United Kingdom originally  shifted counter-terrorism  e fforts after 
negotiating the Northe rn Ireland pe ace proce ss. Prior to th at point, the  British h ad an 
evolving strategy to deal with the Irish Republican Ar my ( IRA) terrorist threat, which 
included tactics such as government censorship, prohibitions on gatherings and the ability 
to arrest and detain individua ls on arres t warrants for pres cribed periods of tim e. These 
powers, which would run contrary to the United States Co nstitution, p rovide for fewer 
civil liberties but have served as a considerab le tool in governm ent efforts to thwart acts 
of terror.  This 42-day holding period allows  British authorities adequate time to perform 
searches and carry o
ng their case.  
Among the immediate changes that did take place in the UK as a result of the 9/11 
attacks were a com prehensive rev iew of preparedness an d contingen cy plans an d a 
renewed effort to rein stitute indefinite deten tion. Beyond the convergence of the 
intelligence community on the thr eat of  Mu slim extrem ism, the British intellige nce 
community also directed its efforts to the use of unconventional weapons and established 
a Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC). Similar to fusion and JTTF efforts undertaken 
in the United States to increase the capacity  for information sharing between government 
entities, the JTAC is located at MI5 and is  staffed with personnel from  law enforcement 
and relevant stakeholder agenci es. While the JTAC does not pl ay an operational role, as 
the JTTFs d o in the Un ited S tates, it reliev es the operation al agen cies of encum bering 
intelligence as they prepare intelligence briefs for the central 
sessments obtained from their intelligence agencies.  
Since its inception in 2003, the JTAC has come to be known as an effective 
analytical r esource in  addressing  interna tional ter rorist threats ag ainst the United  
Kingdom a nd its interests. The J TAC is also responsib le for settin g the threat level  
(comparable to the DHS role 
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The Head of JTAC is accountable direc tly to the Director General of the 
Security Service, who in turn reports to the Joint Intelligence Committee 
on JTAC's performance of its functi ons. An Oversight Board, chaired by 
the Cabin et Office, ens ures that JT AC m eets custom er req uirements b y 
monitoring the effectiveness  of JT AC's system s for engaging with 
customer departments. (UK Intelligence Community, 2009) 
In contrast to the 16 ag encies enco mpassing th e inte lligence community in the  
United States, the British system consists of three primary agencies: the MI5, MI6 (Secret 
Intelligence Service) and the Governm ent Communicati on Headquarters (GCHQ). The 
MI5, which is also known as the Security Service, has responsibility for national security 
and domestic threats. T he MI6 has the re sponsibility for providing the UK governm ent 
with inform ation on persons, events, et c. on foreign soil. The Governm ent 
Communications Headquarters handles prim arily s ignals inte lligence, includ ing 
electronic c ommunications. Sim ilar to the U. S. inte lligence shif t s ubsequent to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom has evolved to take on a greater role in 
issues such as dom estic terrorism, drug traffi cking and organ ized crime. Unlike the U.S. 
system, where the Direc tor of National Intelligence is the s ole person with overs ight of 
national intelligence, the MI5 reports to the home secretary, while MI6 and GCHQ report 
to the Foreign Secretary.  
In distinction to the m ultitude of  law en forcement agencies  in the United States  
that have the capacity and authorities to  collect intelligence related to terror ism, the UK 
has stream lined this  pro cess. Unlike  the U. S., where the  m ajority of agencies have no 
representative assigned to a fusion center, JTTF or specific intelligence function, all 
British police agencies have a dedicated unit,  which are known as a Special Branch (S B). 
The officers  assigned to SBs are scrutinized, trained and directed by  the MI5 to collect 
intelligence in support of national s ecurity investigations. W ithin the London 
Metropolitan Police, th ere ar e two  specif ic un its th at add ress coun ter-terrorism. The 
SO12 (Special Operations) was created  in th e late 1800s in response to violence 
conducted by Irish Nationalists and the SO13 (also known as the Anti-Terrorist squad). 
Both of these units were restructured in October of 2006 into the form ation of SO15, 
which is also known as the new Counter Terrorism Command.  
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The Counter Terrorism Command has a number of goals pertaining to tactical and 
intelligence accountabilities. Primary intelligence objectives include the following: 
 To bring  to  jus tice tho se engag ed in  ter rorist, dom estic extrem ist and 
related offenses  
 To provide a proactive and reacti ve response to te rrorist, dom estic 
extremist and related offenses, including the prevention and disruption of 
terrorist activity  
 Support the National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations outside 
London  
 To gather and exploit intelligence on terrorism and extremism in London  
 To assess, analyze and develop intelligence to drive operational activity  
 To engage in partnership with  London’s comm unities in order to  
understand their concerns and to provide reassurance and support where 
needed  
 To provide specialist security advice and services internally and externally  
 To provide an explosive ordnance disposal and CBRN capability in 
London  
 To assist th e British Security Se rvice and Secret Intelligen ce Service in 
fulfilling their statutory roles  
 To be the police single point of cont act f or interna tional partn ers in  
counter-terrorism matters  
 Assisting in the  protection  of  British  in terests ove rseas and  th e 
investigation of attacks against those interests (Metropolitan Police, 2009) 
The other benefit that B ritish agencies posse ss is their ability to connect directly 
to MI5 through an IT link. This network provide s for the rapid circulat ion of intelligence 
both horizontally and vertically, and incorporat es all relevant stakeholders. In essence, 
the SB’s an d IT link bestow every police ag ency in the United Kingdo m with access to 
requisite intelligence. With a much smaller system than in th e U.S., the e stablishment of 
this link is a far easier task.  
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According to the UK’s Hom e Office, there are 52 total police forces in England, 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (Home Office, 2009). In England and Wales alone, 
there are “140,500 police officers , 14,000 volunteer special cons tables and 13,400 
community support officers ” (Home Office, 2009). The prim ary difference between  the 
U.S. and its  British cou nterparts is that a ll police f orces in  the UK operate und er the 
oversight and direction of the Home Office as  opposed to a m ultitude of state, local and  
federal government entities. While British chie fs control and direct their regional forces, 
a central overseer of police operations provi des an inherent benefit in ensuring the 
efficacy of interagency  inform ation shari ng. The Hom e Office system  also touts the 
ability to “ prevent politic al interf erence in policing an d avoid giving any single  
organization power over the entire police service” (Home Office, 2009). 
Just as technology has proven to be critical for sharin g information across agency 
boundaries in the United States, the United Ki ngdom also relies on national databases to 
facilitate this process.  One current initiative is the “IMPACT Programme,” which aspires 
to enhance information sharing of the police service throughout England and Wales. Just 
as SAR in the United States seeks to  standardize information sharing practices, IMPACT 
also seeks to develop comm on standards for the m anagement of police inform ation 
through guidance as well as a statutory code of practice.  
In orde r to  ensure  tha t polic e wer e ef fectively captu ring relev ant in formation 
pertaining to crim e and/or terrorism in th e British Polic e Service, th e now def unct 
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) established national priorities through the 
publication of a National Intelligence Model (NIM).  Since that tim e, the NCIS has been  
incorporated into the Serious and Organized  Crime Agency (SOCA), wh ich continues to 
use this m odel (in addition to Law Enfor cement Agencies [LEA’s ]). The priorities 
recognized as taking precedent under this model include: 
 The targeting of prolific offenders through overt and covert means. 
 Managing crime and disorder hotspots. 
 Identifying and investigating linked series of crime or incidents 
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 Applying prevention measures that include working with a broad range of 
other disciplines. (Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 2000) In essence, 
the intellig ence service recognized  the im portance of intellig ence in  
maximizing the efficiency of police re sources by analyzing intelligence to 
interpret the  criminal environment and provide decision m akers with the 
opportunity to address crim e hotspots and preempt crim inal acts through 
proactive counterm easures. This e ffort, which ultim ately cam e to be  
known as “intelligence-led policing” has altered policing ef forts in both 
the U.S. an d the  UK in  the rea lms of both crim e fighting and hom eland 
security. W ithin the United Kin gdom, intelligence -led polic ing has 
become a mainstay in incorporating traditional community policing efforts 
and terror prevention programs.  
Although ILP has been slower to evolve in  the United States, this seem s to be a  
logical progression of problem  and community oriented polic ing efforts that recognize 
the im portance of strong police interaction within the communities they serve. While 
some agencies m ay view ILP as terrorism  centric, the su ccess of  the N ew York Polic e 
Department’s (NYPD) Com pStat program illustrated the success of basing deployments 
of police to areas where they could h ave the greatest impact on crime—or as Jack Maple 
(former NYPD) would say, “putting cops  on dots” (Maple, 1999). As m any pre-
operational terro rist a ctivities a re likely to  be  discover ed by eith er c ommunities, the 
private sector or non-police entities, it is imperative that police agencies have strong 
relationships in pla ce a nd the ab ility to ef ficiently co llect, analyze  an d share re levant 
information.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING IDENTIFIED 
APPROACHES 
While there is g reat disparity in the  number of law enf orcement agencies with in 
the law enf orcement communities of the Un ited Kingdom  and the United States and 
challenges in the coordination of infor mation sharing, there are a number of lucrative 
efforts in p lace to adv ance th is p rocess. Leveraging technology to  insure expedient 
exchange o f infor mation and providing gr eater access to inform ation held by other  
agencies is param ount. Listed below are a nu mber of comparative solutions that can be  
incorporated to enhance the ef fectiveness of  inf ormation/intelligence sharing in  the  
United States.  
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1. JTTF Model  
The JTTF model em ployed in the U.S. a nd the JTAC in the UK were establishe d 
with the  intent of  breaking down th e barr iers that can  sometimes exist between f ederal 
and local law enforcement ag encies. W hile the JTAC is non-operational and the JT TF 
does not have non-federal police officers from a ll state and local agencies participating, 
they both s how efficacy in break ing down th e communication barriers between federal 
officials and their counterparts on the state, local and tribal levels. State and local officers 
in the U.S. are also being assi gned to federal counter-terrori sm centers to play an even 
greater role in operations and rapid dissemination of infor mation. In a recent m eeting of 
local coun ter-terrorism officials with the Fede ral Bureau o f Investigations Intern ational 
Terrorism Operations Center (2009), local o fficers were briefed on th eir roles in actively 
working cases as Task Force Officers (TFO’s) and their empowerment to obtain warrants 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA, and make operational decisions.  
Recommendation—In order to increase the coope ration between state, local, 
tribal and federal agencies, agencies with the opportunity and resources to do so should 
assign officers to work with the JTTF, International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS) 
and maintain desk positions or develop a li aison with both the National JTTF and at the 
National Operations Center (NOC). Based upon the analysis of the UK, it would be 
preferential to have every agency in the U.S. with som e type of SB representation and an 
intelligence link to a  federal intelligence entity. Nationally, as it w ould not be pragm atic 
in the United States  to have every law enforcement agency represented within a JTTF, a 
technological solution to share intelligen ce, alo ng with a designated point of contact 
(POC) is paramount to effectively p roviding intelligence from the higher echelons to the 
officers on the street. While the recommenda tion for a p rimary POC can be h andled 
immediately, the d iscussion of an  IT so lution is discussed furt her in the second 
recommendation.  
2. Sharing Intelligence 
While the UK has f ar f ewer IC and police agencies to  f acilitate inf ormation 
sharing between, the centrali zed reporting through th e Home Office is not a possibility 
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under the cooperative f ederalist system  in the United States. The U.S. system  further 
complicates the challenges of passing actionab le intelligence to the officer on the beat as 
there a re no SB’s (or com parable entity ) w ithin th e vast m ajority of  U.S. police  
agencies—and thus no counter-terrorism (CT) component.  
Recommendation—In order to better facilitate th e exchange of inform ation and 
analysis of intelligen ce in the United Stat es, it is recomm ended that th e United States  
continue to employ the use of fusion centers to share information and provide intelligence 
pertaining to terrorism , crim inal activity and all h azards events. Just as th e Un ited 
Kingdom has standardized intelligence and operational structures, it is recommended that 
a concerted effort be m ade to  standardize best practices pertaining to fusion centers 
within the United States. With the publication of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Fusion 
Center Guidelines and  the conseq uent release of th e De partment of Justice’s (DOJ) 
Baselines Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, these efforts are 
already underway. It is furthe r recommended that the Depart ment of Homeland Security, 
Department of Justice, and Office of th e P rogram Manager, Inform ation Sharing 
Environment (PM-ISE) continue to play an active role in coordinating these efforts. 
It is equa lly important that these c enters a re in com pliance with laws r egarding 
the protections of privacy and civil lib erties—specifically 28 Code of Fe deral 
Regulations (CFR) Part 23. Annual training is recommended to address this issue, and 
technology should be used to pur ge information that has no legal justification for being 
maintained. Law enforcem ent agencies should consider coordinating efforts with civil 
liberties groups to provide for transparency in  operations and assure that regulations and 
policies are being appropriately followed.  
Based on the United Kingdom  e xperience, it is furthe r recomm ended that all 
agencies access and maintain an IT link to a single intelligence service in order to support 
national security investigations and provide officers with situational awareness. Th e IT  
link to M I5 in the United Kingdom  fills this voi d that is cu rrently both widespread and 
largely una ddressed in  the United  States Inte lligence-led policing has proven to be a 
valuable tool in the United Kingdom and shou ld continue to be expanded in the United 
States in co njunction with ex isting and evolving community policing efforts. Suspicious 
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activity reporting should becom e standard ope rational procedure for all agencies in the 
U.S., regardless of size, with federal as sistance and coordination in providing and 
accessing information from a centralized database. Technology and training are critical to 
this effort as m any agencies lack the acuity and/or finances to im plement an effective 
SAR program . Expanding the utility of la w enforcem ent officers as collecto rs of 
information, and consequently private indus try and other partners, will exponentially 
improve the likelihood of preempting the next terrorist attack.  
The United Kingdom  and the United Stat es share a great comm itment in 
protecting dem ocracy, while at the sam e ti me bearing the accountability to keep their 
citizens saf e from  terrorism . Inform ation sharing initiatives in both countries are  
continuing to progress in a m anner consis tent with the expanding threat. G lobal 
cooperation in identifying and brin ging terroris ts to jus tice will rem ain critical to  the 
success and  saf ety of  both nations and the role of  intellig ence will c ontinue to be a 
decisive factor. This section a ddressed the res earch question: What lessons can be 
learned from other countries and outside the law enforcement realm pertaining to 
technology, organizational structure, and information sharing that can successfully be 
applied to improve the information sharing environment in the United States? Applying 
the smart practices, being uti lized in the UK and around the world, will aid the relevant 
agencies in  reinventin g currently  used p rocesses and other ineffi ciencies tha t have 
hindered progress in this realm.  
E. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PARTNERS 
As intelligence functions in the realm of homeland security are predominantly law 
enforcement related, th e central f ocus is prim arily on tactic al intelligence that pass es on 
suspect info rmation and crim inal activity. To effectively in tegrate inform ation sharing 
into all aspects of c ounterterrorism events, law enforcem ent at all levels should consider 
working beyond traditional paradigms and seek out the expe rtise of colleagues outside of 
law enforcement to build a capacity for stra tegic intelligence. Open source inform ation, 
which comprises the m ajority of the products that are worked on, can be easily 
distributed both vertically and across agen cy boundaries. This stra tegic intelligence 
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approach w ill im prove coordina tion regiona lly and proactively in m utual ef forts to 
converge on future threats from an all-hazards perspective. 
In working toward the goal of protecting the homeland, it is beneficial that the 
law enforcement, fire and emergency medical services and other key stakeholders have a  
general understanding of each other’s roles and  responsibilities, the h istory and curren t 
threats rela ted to ter rorism and the resourc es available to th em. It is eq ually important 
that each ag ency has a select num ber of ke y personnel wh o are read ily availab le, who 
have the following: specialized equipm ent, enhanced netw orking capabilities, specific 
training to identify signs of te rrorism and the c apacity to act as a lia ison with inte r- and 
intra-agency personnel.   
The m ajority of current recruit and a nnual training program s are insufficient at 
keeping personnel abreast of the global trends in terror ist activity. S pecific training 
programs are needed to bridge this gap, enhance inter-agency bonds, improve operational 
readiness and enhance the common operating p icture. A consolidated training progra m 
for specially train ed inter-agency  m embers within geographical regions is also a 
necessary component for inter-agency readiness. 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in 
Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (W hite House, 2007), also calls for 
the development of a collaborative process with input from members of the federal, state, 
local, tribal agencies and pr ivate sector from  across the nation. Current system s for the 
collection o f intellig ence need to  be standar dized f or credibility a nd assessed  and 
disseminated in a consequential m anner. The ri sk in neglecting to do so could result in 
information failing to be passed on to relevant personnel.  
In leveraging relationships, infor mation and resources to add ress terrorist threats 
as well as crim inal incidents, the concerte d focus on the collection, analysis and sharing 
of information should encompass the following course of action:  
 Collecting and analyzing im portant information provided by as m any 
public and private sources as possible;  
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 Dissemination of inform ation to public  and private networks, entities and 
personnel, based on “need” and “ri ght” to know guidelines and in 
consideration of the responsibility to share that information;  
 Collecting feedback on the inform ation shared from  these sources, which 
will be am assed f rom their own experienc es, observations,  contacts an d 
records. More than one round of dissem ination/sharing m ay be 
accomplished as feedback is  recei ved and add itional oppo rtunities are 
created to build upon the initial dissemination; 
 Developing more and better information and “pictures” about people, their 
associates and potential threats (“enrichm ent”) based upon initial and 
subsequent rounds of disseminations; and 
 End sharing and dissem ination processes by circulating final, “enriched” 
information regard ing each tip an d lead  to federal,  state , regional and 
involved networks to further support individual and collaborative efforts 
designed to  prepare for, m itigate against, resp ond to and recover fro m 
terrorist threats and activities. 
F. LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY TO REACH AN EXPANDING POOL OF 
CONSUMERS (THE DC EXPERIENCE) 
Just a few short years ago, intelligence operatio ns within th e DC Metropolitan  
Police Department were conducted under the purview of the Office of the Superintendent 
of Detectives and were separated  into thr ee distin ct entities, which were located at  
separate sites and with  little interaction. W hile these units produced reports on patterns 
such as  gan g activity  a nd af filiation, ther e were no f ormal proces ses in place  to  pass 
information on to  the  custom ers o r re ceive infor mation from  those sam e consum ers. 
Information was typic ally obta ined af ter a c rime was comm itted, and usually whe n the  
investigating officer had reason to suspect  som e type of gang ac tivity. Likewise, 
intelligence on homeland security related matters was shared at the higher echelons of the 
department but did not always m ake its way down to the officers in the field in a tim ely 
manner.  
An analysis of existing processes in dicated the lack of a database specif ically to 
collect suspicious activity reporting. Likewise, the use of PD 76s (stop/contact 
information) proved insufficient for getting information into the hands  of the appropriate 
personnel in an expedient m anner. As this  inform ation was  docum ented m anually and 
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subsequently entered in to Colum bo (a local po lice databas e), the pote ntial ex isted f or 
information to be lost. Failing to have an au tomated system also created  a roadblock  for 
intelligence analysts or detectives a ttempting to contact an o fficer to exchange or collect 
additional information that could further an investigation.  
1. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Overview 
The Metropolitan Police Departm ent currently has 4,017 s worn members and is  
the seventh largest police organization in  the country. In Septem ber of 2007, the 
Homeland Security Bureau was created by Ch ief Cathy Lanier and given oversight of 
both the newly for med Intelligence Fusion Division and Special Op erations Division 
(SOD). The changes to the organiz ational struc ture of  the MPD create d the ability  to 
incorporate an intelligence capacity into the daily activities and m ajor events th at are  
currently handled by SOD personnel.  While the MPD has a robust Joint Terrorism  Task 
Force and a small but dedicated Domestic Security Office (DSO), a m ajor challenge was 
to ensure that all officers were train ed and equipped to know the signs  of terror and take 
preemptive m easures. By com bining MPD resources with the multitude  o f law  
enforcement and city ag ency resources availa ble in the Dis trict of  Columbia, the MPD 
has greatly expanded its abiliti es to deter terrorist events  and im prove response to both 
all-crimes and all-hazards situations.  
In analy zing MPD’s c apacity to com pete with the d emands of  committing 
resources to counterterrorism efforts and m eeting the service needs of the community, it 
is important to understand the severity of cr ime in the District of Columbia. Like m any 
major cities  in the  United State s, the Distr ict has a s erious leve l of  c rime to add ress. 
According to FBI statistics, in 2006, the rate of violent crime in W ashington, D.C. was 
1445.84 crim es per 100,000 residents (FBI, 2009). Am ong the cities reporting with a 
population of 100,000 or more, Washington ranked eighteenth in its rate of violent crime  
(FBI, 2009). As these num bers illustrate the challenges of committing resources, they 
also suggest the need for working in partnership beyond traditional boundaries.  
Aside f rom the lim itations and f ailures of  f ederal law enf orcement to shar e 
information that were identif ied in the 9/11 Commission Report, the Comm ission’s 
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concerns ab out the  acc essibility to  inte ragency databases rem ains a problem . (9/11 
Commission, 2004). Although strides with the law enforcem ent infor mation exchange 
program (LINX) have improved the situation in the National Capitol Region, m uch work 
remains. The LINX program , whic h was star ted by the Naval Criminal Inv estigative 
Service and launched in DC in Novem ber of 2007, allows m ore than 60 local police 
agencies to access a co mmon database. The ch allenge, ho wever, lies in ensuring that 
members within the MP D, and throughout the region, are trained to use the system , are 
inputting data into the system and are standardizing policies for use.  
Technology has also dram atically i mproved the ability for law enforcem ent 
officers to reach out beyond thei r walls to access inform ation from both the pub lic and 
private sectors. Initiatives such as MPD’s tip line (888- 919-CRIME) and text m essaging 
tool (50-411) allows commun ity mem bers to provide immediate  inf ormation regarding  
criminal or terrorist activity  through easily accessi ble and anonym ous means. This is in 
addition to the Terro rist Incident Prevention Program (TIPP), which is c urrently in place 
and targets the business community and service agencies.  
DC’s fusion center, kno wn as the Washi ngton Regional T hreat Analysis Center 
(WRTAC) also provides a variety of intelligen ce products to law enforcem ent as well as 
the public and private sector to  increase its levels of awareness and seek s information in 
return. These products, which rely on technology for distribution include:  
 WRTAC Daily Summary: a law enforcem ent sensitive (LES) publication 
that is d isseminated fi ve tim es a week (the Monday edition covers  
Saturday and Sunday). This documen t provides a summ ary of local and 
national crime trends, local significant  events, summary of the FBI field  
intelligence group (FIG) report, summ ary of closed source fire, health and 
officer safety-awareness i ssues. The distribution of this docum ent has  
increased from 1200 to 5000 recipients since October of 2007.  
 A bi-weekly officer safety and crim inal intelligence issues p roduct: Also 
LES, which provides a summary of national officer safety and intelligence 
related material.  
 A weekly or bi-weekly fire watch produc t that discusses item s of interest 
relating to the fire service, security, safety and terrorism.  
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 A daily open source brief (DOSB), which is distributed three to five times 
per week with no dissem ination restrictions: This product is a compilation 
of open source m edia articles relati ng to hom eland security, terroris m 
trends, public safety, public health, disaster preparedness and other 
subjects relevant to decision m akers in the public and private sectors. The 
DOSB is being redistributed on Infr aGuard, Hom eland Security Digital 
Library, Global Incident Map an d through num erous local police 
departments, private businesses and military entities. The total distribution 
as of June 2009 was approxim ately 30,000 readers in the U.S. and 8 
foreign countries. Notable groups w ho have requested DO SB distribution 
include: Naval Postgraduate Studen ts, Senator Lieberm an’s Offi ce, 
Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Ba nk of Am erica Corporate Security 
and the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration. 
 An MPD most wanted vehicles used in vio lent crim es bulletin: this la w 
enforcement sensitive d ocument is dist ributed weekly or more frequently 
as needed to citywide and regional law enforcement agencies with special 
attention to patrol divisions. This bulletin enhances the awareness of patrol 
officers for vehicles wanted in viol ent crimes throughout the city. These 
bulletins have also enabled cro ss-border enf orcement in itiatives, 
information sharing, and facilitation of arrest and recovery of property.  
These products are augmented by an array  of  services, programs and initia tives, 
which seek  to keep th e relevant s takeholders well inform ed and e quipped with the 
knowledge they need to protect them selves as well as their comm unity. They also 
exemplify how human intelligence can be improved at the local level by reaching out to a 
greater num ber of both internal and external  custom ers, which add resses th e research  
question: How can current human intelligence (HUMINT) collection at the local level be 
augmented by reaching out beyond the traditional law enforcement community? Beyond 
the materials provided, structured m eetings enhance the partnerships and allow for the 
stakeholders to further participate in this collaborative security effort.  
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IV. THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC INFORMATION SHARING 
A. TEMPERATURE BOARD INITIATIVE—A NEW VIEW IN SHARING 
Disseminating information and actionable intelligence throughout an agency and 
across agency boundaries can pose a num ber of obstacles. Police officers, for example, 
are inundated with excessive information pert aining to crime, wanted persons, vehicles, 
etc. on a daily basis. With a short tim e typically alloca ted in roll calls to discuss th ese 
issues, as well as daily in service training a nd other priority information, ancillary means 
of communicating vital inform ation to the  rank and f ile creates a dilemma. As roll calls  
are typically conducted at the beginning of an officer’s shif t, this sets an additional 
challenge of communicating info rmation to officers that occu rs subsequent to the time  
that they have taken their assignm ents. While communicating to officers via radio is one 
frequently used option, it can use substantial air tim e and is a one dimensional method of 
communication, which may not be readily acted upon—pending the time of the particular 
simulcast.  
One of the strateg ies recently impl emented by the DC Metropolitan Police 
Department in order to im prove this pro cess and keep m embers abreast of  rea l-time 
actionable intelligence, entails the use of  “temperature boards.” While this is one tool in  
an arsen al, it has pro ved effectiv e in accel erating reg ional inf ormation to  cr itical 
stakeholders. In e-m ail survey’s completed by District comm anders and comm and staff 
from their respective d istricts, they  desc ribed the tem perature board  as an “excellent” 
means of providing up to date inform ation and aiding in the arrest of numerous wanted 
subjects th at ar e pos ted to th e boards boards (Sgt. D. Jo nes, personal communication, 
July, 2009) As of July, 2009, m ore than 4,200 pi ctures and profiles of wanted persons 
have been displayed on internal and regional temperature boards. (Sgt. D. Jones, personal 
communication, July, 2009). Beyond the Distri ct of Colum bia, the W ashington 
Metropolitan Region is the eighth largest district in the United States with more than five 
million residents, while the Dis trict of Co lumbia is hom e to nearly  600,000 people. All 
three branches of the U.S. federal governm ent are housed in the Dist rict of Colum bia in 
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addition to 12 univers ities, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As the 
nation’s capitol, W ashington, D.C., has a sign ificant number of m useums, monuments, 
military bas es and critical inf rastructures that are consid ered high va lue targ ets f or 
terrorists. T he National Capital Region is also vulnerab le to a m yriad of hazards  
including in frastructure disruptions, hazardous material spills and severe weather. The 
District is also served by one of the nation’ s most f requently used public transpo rtation 
systems (Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority) with an estimated 33 percent 
of the District’s labor force using public  transportation on a daily basis. As the 
Metropolitan Police D epartment plays a v ital role in en suring the safety of district 
residents, workforce and the roughly 20 m illion visitors that visit the city each year,  the 
use of technology to dissem inate information and intelligence is critical in carrying out 
this mission.  
The a mount of infor mation available to law enforcem ent c ontinues to increase  
exponentially. Specifically, th e DC Metropolitan Police De partment produces numerous 
threat reports, intelligence bulletins, crime information reports, etc. on a daily basis and 
provides a far greater amount of infor mation than can possibly be consum ed.  Since the 
9/11 Commission Report identif ied unity of  ef fort in inf ormation sharing as a priority,  
tremendous steps have been m ade to share information horizontally between the federal 
government and state, local and tribal law enforcement. The proliferation of fusion 
centers has also fostered a culture of collaboration that has m oved beyond law 
enforcement to include agencies  such as em ergency management, health and fire. W ith 
the expanding base of collectors and custom ers, the quantity of information continues to 
grow immensely. 
With multiple systems and massive amounts of data available, current systems for 
providing actionable intelligence to patrol of ficers have bee n inadequate. Im provements 
in exchanging infor mation and intelligence horizontally have not corresponded with an 
equally enhanced vertical flow of intelligence. The utilization of the temperature board is 




information and intelligence sharing process.  As a robust in telligence system will further 
empower first responders to pl ay a greater role as firs t preventers, technological 
applications must play a significant role. 
In essence, the tem perature board con cept co mmenced using electro nic liquid  
crystal display (LCD) temperature b oards that were installed in each dis trict roll call and 
executive complex to support the display of offi cial department information.  In order to 
provide real-tim e inform ation to officers on the beat, the program  was expanded to 
include m obile digital com puters (MDC’s), which are positioned in the scout cars and 
serve a variety of functions.  
Temperature boards were designed to di splay current citywide departm ent 
information on the left vertical half  of th e screen and unit specific inf ormation on the 
right vertical half of the screen. They were  also designed to accomm odate the display of 
scrolling adm inistrative and lookout ticker  infor mation horizontally across the lower 
portion of the screens. This  allo ws for offi cers to obtain imm ediate inform ation 
pertaining to lookouts, wanted vehicles, etc. from  a screen, which is literally at their 
fingertips. In addition to displaying infor mation specific to events in Washington, DC, 
this concept has now expanded to include tim ely lookouts from jurisdictions within the 
National Capital Region as well as flash information on national or international incidents 
that may have either a direct or an indirect impact on the city.  
The next stage for this program seeks to enhance situational awareness beyond the 
police department by expanding the tem perature board initiative to local and federal law 
enforcement partners, as well as DC fire and other key partners. The expansion of this 
initiative will enab le agencies to qu ickly gauge the "real-time" status of events/incid ents 
occurring in and around the District of Colu mbia.  Additionally, it will improve agency 
ability to dissem inate actionable intelligence,  provide real-tim e 911, computer assisted 
dispatch (CAD) and em erging crim e trend in formation occurring within the National 
Capitol Region. The content for the temperature boards can be customized to fit the needs 
of the participating ag encies and include on ly inf ormation deem ed relevan t to  their 
mission.  
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B. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SAR)—LAW ENFORCEMENTS 
BEST HOPE FOR COLLECTING AND CONNECTING THE DOTS 
Improving and standardizing current m ethods to collect, docum ent and analyze 
information that could be relevant to either foreign or domestic terrorism are a priority for 
ensuring a coordinated effort in keeping th e nation safe. One of the prom ising programs 
currently underway in the United States is  the nationwide SAR initiative. This pro ject, 
which is sponsored by the Program Manager Information Sharing Initiative (PM-ISE) has 
garnered the support of all m ajor law enfor cement agencies includ ing the International 
Association of  Chief s of Police, the  Majo r Cities Chief s Associa tion ( MCCA) and the  
National Sherriff’s Association. While the concept of operations (CONOPS) was released 
in Decem ber 2008, sub stantial plan ning has be en done an d expectatio ns are high  for  
moving this project forward. The National Strategy for Information Sharing (White 
House, 2007) called f or the federal govern ment to “support the developm ent of a 
nationwide capacity for gathering, docum enting, processing, analyzing and sharing 
terrorism-related suspicious activity reports (SARs) generated at the lo cal, regional, state 
or federal levels in a m anner that rigorously  protec ts the  privacy an d civil lib erties of 
Americans.”  
The Major City Chiefs Association (2008) released a white paper pertaining to the 
adoption of SAR entitled Twelve Tenets to Prevent Crime and Terrorism, which states: 
Suspicious Activity Reports r epresent not on ly the m eans to identif y and 
measure activities with a possible nexus to terrorism, but also the potential 
thread to connect fusion centers nationwide. As such, they should be 
standardized and institutionalized and, eventually, considered for inclusion 
in the Uniform  Crime Reporting progra m, for a true inf ormation sharing 
environment. Undertaking this instit utionalization and standardization of 
SARS will also support the transition of local law enforcement from  their 
traditional role of “first responders ” to the role of “ first preventers” of a 
broad range of crimes including terrorist acts.  
The SAR process essentially seeks to standardize this pr ocess and gives non-
federal law enforcem ent a prim ary r ole in the collection of inform ation. Technological 
support is also a critical  component of this initiative as SARs are consequently posted to 
a server where they can be accessed by local, state, tribal and federal government as well 
as fusion centers and other relevant stakeholders. Unle ashing the largely untapped 
potential of America’s front line law enfor cement officers greatly enhances the potential 
to preem pt crim e or terrorism . Figure 4 il lustrates how th e SAR f unctional stand ard 
facilitates the information sharing process.   
 
Figure 4.   Notional SAR Process (From BJA, 2008) 
In pursuing the implementation of this policy there are num erous issues that need 




Incorporating SAR into the m ission of state, local and tribal law enforcem ent 
agencies will require the developm ent of dire ctives, training, and c ontinual oversight in 
institutionalizing this pr actice. Am ong the ad ministrative de cisions to be m ade will be 
whether or not to take an all crimes appr oach to reporting and how the inform ation 
collected will be pas sed on f rom the agency or regiona l f usion center to th e Joint 
Terrorism Task Force in an expedient manner.  
2. Legal Criteria 
In order to ensure that  participating agencies are upholding constitutionally 
protected rights, a review and evaluation of departmental policies m ust be considered 
prior to proceeding with the collectio n and sharing of information regarding terrorism or 
crime related activity. As transparency is al so an i mportant factor  in assuring public 
acceptance, policies sho uld also be communicat ed to elected officials  as well as  the 
public. A d etermination also n eeds to be m ade to discern when 28 Code of Federal 
Regulations Part 23, apply. 
3. Technology 
As the im petus f or th is program  is to f acilitate the shar ing of  inf ormation both 
vertically and horizontally, it is im perative that the techn ical applications used have  the 
ability to e nsure s tandardized in teroperability, while at the sam e tim e allowing the 
organization to custom ize SAR applications  to meet ind ividual agency needs. The 
technical application chosen should also be user friendly and be com patible with other 
systems that are currently employed.  
4. Potential Courses of Action / Recommendation Metropolitan 
a. Status Quo 
The first course of action would be to m aintain the status quo, which 
entails the p ath of least resis tance as no change would be enacted. Time and resource 
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constraints that would be im posed as a resu lt of the aforementioned criteria would be a 
non-issue. The vulnerabilities of failing to act, however, would leave agencies susceptible 
to acts of terrorism  as critical inform ation could likely be overlooked, go unreported, or 
fail to be passed on to the relevant node for action. This course of action would also result 
in making the same mistakes that have resulted in past catastrophe.  
b. Agencies and Regions Build their own System 
Agencies and regions also have the option of building their own in-house 
system for SAR. The argum ent in favor of this solution would be that m inimal costs 
would be incurred and solutions w ould likely be compatible with  exis ting systems. On 
the contrary, this wou ld not ensu re compliance with common national standards, which 
are needed if agencies are to overco me pre-existing obstacles that have led to previous 
intelligence f ailures. Likewise, even sy stems that could be applied to specific 
geographical regions are not effectual if or ganizations are failing to com prehensively 
collect and share data with all of the state, local, tribal and federal partners.  
c. Use Accepted Technology for Analyzing Data 
A third option is to use a comm only accepted technology that has the 
capacity to expediently and accurately analyze the collected data and transfer intelligence 
to the appropriate unit for action. T he technologies being explored  and currently being 
utilized are adaptable to  customization while conforming to national standards. This will 
promote interagency as well as intra-agency efficiency, and also provides for the use of 
electronic r eporting to be built in to an arra y of  f ield reports, which will speed up the 
collection a nd sharing process. Th e challenge  with this option is th at there is still 
disagreement as to which platform best serv es this purpose, who owns t he data and what 
hidden costs exist. This third option represen ts the m ost viable alternative and although 
SAR implementation is in its inf ancy, the participating age ncies commencing this ef fort 
will be at th e forefront in taking this ini tiative forward through the following prop osed 
action.  
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Based upon the alternatives available, this last recommendation appears to 
be the m ost viable for m eeting th e needs of  state, local and tribal agencies, wh ile 
adhering to federal standards. Negotiations between the federal agencies and the m ajor 
agencies representing law enforcem ent are lik ely to discern the appropriate preference 
that will meet the collaborative needs of all interests.  
5. The Institutionalism of a Counterterrorism Outlook for the Law 
Enforcement Community and Beyond 
The majority of Am ericans are keenly awar e of the m alicious intent o f terrorist 
organizations to inf lict harm  to U.S. citiz ens both at home and abroa d. Yet, very  f ew 
people m aintain a sense of urgency in deve loping or participating in strategies to 
minimize the consequences—including psycholog ical consequences of terrorism through 
preventive efforts. Terrorism, unlike most other forms of crime or trauma, has a specific 
purpose in seeking to exact pe rvasive psychological fear an d pain. The potential for an 
asymmetric attack using weapons such as chemical, biological, ra diological or nuclear 
creates an even deeper s ense of vulnerability with an enhanced fear of th e unknown. In a 
2004 Harris Interactive poll, the m ajority of survey participants  in both the United States 
and Britain indicated little wo rry about a terrorist attack, with less than 10 percent of 
Americans worrying “a lot”—ju st three years after the tragedy of 9/11 (Taylor, 2004). 
One clear difference in the poll was that the Americans had much more confidence in the 
ability of the government to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack.  
Just as m any organizations assign com plex tasks and d ecisions to team s as 
opposed to a sole person at the top of a hierarchy, team performance—including effective 
information sharing— are vital to counterterr orism efforts. In a recent research report  
(Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009), a m eta-analysis of infor mation and tea m 
performance revealed that inform ation shar ing can be enh anced by: s tructuring team 
discussions, fra ming team s’ tasks as intell ective and promoting a cooperative tea m 
climate. While teams typically possess a f unctional advantage over individuals, the study 
gleaned that teams fail to share info rmation when “they most need to do so.” Figure 5 
illustrates the relevance of openness and unique ness in effectively dealing with complex 
problems or tasks. Uniqueness in this contex t refers to the diversity of the experts 
involved, which allows for a wide range of views to develop a quality solution.  
 
Figure 5.   Two-Dimensional Typology to Team Information Sharing and Team 
Outcomes (From Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009)  
The relevance of this  material pertains to  the need for a co llaborative team effort 
to provide for an effectual information sharing process. With so many Americans having 
low levels of concern about a terrorist att ack, this creates an ancillary challenge of 
encouraging the public to be proactive partne rs in efforts to  preempt acts of crim e and 
terror th rough particip ating in in formation sharing networks. The question to be 
considered, therefore, is how to get the public involved as en thusiastic partners in this 
mission.  
Upon reviewing research pertaining to the inaction of persons or groups in 
emergency settings, stories such as the para ble of the 38 witnesses, which involved the 
1964 m urder of Kitty Genovese, com e to m ind. In this  p articular sto ry that received 
widespread public attention, it was repor ted that 38 witnesses had observed Ms. 
Genovese being attacked and stabbed, without in tervening or making an effort to contact 
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the police. While much of this story has since been proven to be exaggerated, it does raise 
questions about the reasons that individuals or groups would fail to intervene in a sim ilar 
scenario. Furtherm ore, if there are reasons that inhibit the involvem ent in em ergency 
scenarios, then what is the likelihood that ordinary citizens  will take steps to report 
suspicious activ ity or potentially  crim inal behavior rather than  being just passive 
bystanders? The quote attributed to Edm und Burke, which reads “The only thing 
necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing,” (Burke, n.d.) reinforces 
the need for citizens to take some kind of action—even if it involves notifying authorities 
through a phone call.  
Although there can be a m ultitude of reasons that people may not step forward to 
get involved in a situation (e .g., they feel som eone else is more qualified to help), one  
phenomenon that offers to explain this is  known as the “bystander effect.” This 
occurrence addresses em ergency situations where individuals are less likely to inte rcede 
when there are others present and argues that  the m ore people in attendance, the less 
likely th at s omeone will step forward to assis t. In a releas e published  by the Canada 
Safety Council, (2004) the coun cil addresse s this  type of citizen com placency and 
provides an overview of why people fail to get involved and also  simple tips such as how 
to quickly place an effective 911 call from a mobile telephone.  
Certainly, there are m any acts of heroism  and vast accounts of people w ho report 
emergencies or seem ingly m ore trivial events  on a daily basis with no recognition or 
desire to be recognized. Instead of fo cusing on the negative aspects of inaction, 
developing new insights  into th e positive deeds of those who choose to be engaged and 
get involved with bo th emergency and even less er scenarios is receiving more attention. 
In his book The Lucifer Effect, Dr. Phillip  Zimbardo (2007 ) addresses  the dynam ics of 
seemingly ordinary people, who transcend their roles  as  passive observers to do 
extraordinary deeds. He describes this phenomenon as “the banality of heroism,” which is 
seemingly accompanied by a certain sense of hum ility in v iewing individual ac tions as 
the norm rather than a heroic feat (Zim bardo, 2007) At a lecture in Philadelphia in June, 
2009, Zimbardo expanded on this by proposing th at people are m ore likely to do good 
and think positively about the future when th ey can im agine themselves acting a heroic 
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manner. He also advo cates the im portance of teaching this m ental rehearsal, which will 
prepare individuals to take appropriate m oral action in the event that the need a rises. If 
this philosophy can becom e ingrained thr oughout society, the diffusion of personal 
responsibility due to the presence of others c ould be replaced by an intrinsic call to take 
action.  
In the realm of hom eland security, this type of heroic actio n does not necessarily 
have to m ean that p eople are  requ ired to  run into burning buildings to save babies. If 
societal norms advocated civic virtu e and es tablished behaviors focused on the positive, 
more people might be willing to take basic st eps such as rep orting a crime or suspicious  
activity in stead of disregarding an  atypical situation that m ay require intercession. 
Aristotle once said that “ We are what we re peatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, 
but a habit” (Present Outlook, 2009) This statement applies as m uch to doing good and 
becoming a principle based citizen playing a functional role in society, as it does to eating 
healthy or any given habit.  
While developing habitually m oral principl es may appear to be a very personal 
endeavor, Zim bardo (2007) proposes, “Governm ent, educa tion, and social institutions 
can be re-designed to facilitate critical th inking and responsible conduct.” Am ong the 
highlights he offers for achieving this type of thinking and conduct include the following 
ideas:  
1. Teaching children to disobey unjust authority  
2. Rewarding social modeling of moral behavior  
3. Promoting critical thinking that chal lenges false ideologies and bad m eans 
to good ends  
4. Encouraging respect for hum an di versity and appreciating human 
variability  
5. Not allowing stereotyping and dehumanization of other people  
6. Changing social conditions that make people feel anonymous  
7. Encouraging adm ission of m istakes, accepting error in  jud gments – to 
reduce justification for continuing wrong, immoral behavior  
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8. Promoting personal responsibility and accountability of one’s actions  
9. Supporting independence over group conformity  
10. Reducing poverty, inequities, and entitlements of the privileged  
11. Never sacrificing freedom for promised security  
12. Discouraging even the s mallest of transgressions, cheating, gossiping, 
lying, teasing or bullying. (Zimbardo, 2007) 
Ascertaining a sense of e mpathy for othe rs may allow individuals to be m ore 
cognizant of others and lead them to act in a more compassionate manner. Likewise, with 
more people committing to personal accountability, there may be a greater likelihood that 
they will take action in even non-emergency situations in which they can contribute to the 
overall good of society. W ith the mounting av ailability of comm unication devices and 
social networking applications, participation in both local and global efforts is essentially 
at the fingertips of m any Americans. If governm ent at all levels is able to establish and 
maintain the trust of  those that it se rves, there is an escalating probability that greater 
numbers of citizens will take  proactive m easures to becom e involved in keeping their 
communities safe.  
C. TECHNOLOGY STUDY 
1. Evaluation of the FBI’s eGuardian Program 
Through the FBI’s eGuardian, which was de veloped and released in the summer  
of 2008, a num ber of positive features we re noted. Among those that were m ost 
appealing were: 
 Ability to  access eGuardian throug h Law Enforcement Online (LEO); as 
LEO is eas y to access , it p rovides a secu re environm ent to acces s 
eGuardian, which consequently allo ws officers to access  unclass ified 
information from eGuardian.  
 eGuardian was advertised as a comprehensive tool with alert, warning and 
reporting capabilities, which would be flexible to m eet the needs of  the 
individual participating agencies.  
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 eGuardian appeared easy to use and allowed the  ability to a ttach a variety 
of file types (e.g., images and documents).  
While eGuardian prom ised to provide free and effortless access,  there are 
lingering concerns about the ownership of infor mation with this system and the ability to 
share inform ation with other state,  local and tribal law enforcem ent agencies. Fro m a 
security perspective, the FBI’s system seems to be viable and knowing the security levels 
required to access eGuardian throug h Law En forcement Online, there is no reaso n to 
believe that there are any gaps to be ex ploited. The greatest potential benefit of 
proceeding with the eG uardian op tion is the threat trackin g system  that would allow 
agencies to pull unclassified information from eGuardian.  
As this system commenced with a phased law enforcement rollout in December of 
2008, additional testing and revi ew is currently underway. A number of Virginia police 
departments and the Northern Virginia Regiona l Intelligence Center have signed on to 
conduct work flow testing. This wo rk flow review will s crutinize the systems in place 
and will provide an opportunity for agencies to gauge the progress and practicality of this 
system.  
2. Evaluation of the Program Manager–Information Sharing 
Environment Program 
The second alternative studied involved the implementation of the SAR functional 
standard that was recommended by the Major Cities Chiefs Association. This Information 
Sharing En vironment–Suspicious Activity  Report (ISE-S AR) pilot program  seeks to 
examine the f unctionality of  the I SE-SAR criteria guidan ce and th e sharing of this 
information between f usion centers,  JTTFs, the  f ederal gov ernment and the m ajor city  
law enforcement agencies. The purpose of this  project is to evaluate SAR developm ent 
and its p otential to  evolve into an enduring inform ation sharing capability. 
Coincidentally, the FBI is also a project partner and sponsor for this initiative. Among the 
other sponsors are:  
 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance  
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
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 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment  
 Major Cities Chiefs Association  
 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
 Department of Defense (DoD) Antiterrorism/ Force Protection 
 DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Criminal Intelligence 
Coordinating Council (CICC) 
With the DOJ/BJA supporting the PM-ISE, who serves as the program  manager, 
the potential benefits of participating in this project are as follows: 
 This program leverages  shared spa ce and will extrac t susp icious ac tivity 
data from existing systems (rather than creating a new system) and share it 
with other law enforcement agencies in the ISE.  
 Agencies will store and own their data and will make the determination as 
to which in formation to share and  th e frequency of data to the shared 
space.  
 DOJ and th e PM-ISE w ill work with part icipating agencies to es tablish a 
privacy policy and training program that are consistent with organizational 
needs.  
 The PM-ISE will purchase the shared space servers and provide a p roject 
team to work with participating IT staffs to design the technology 
processes that will facilitate this transfer of identified SAR data.  
While both plans offer a num ber of benefits  that address present deficiencies, the 
ISE-SAR plan appears to have greater support among the state and local law enforcement 
community. The hands on approach in providing assistance with program  
implementation, including legal assistance in  crafting privacy pol icy guidelines and 
working through technology hurdles, was also a cr itical factor in steer ing this decision. 
Figure 6 provides an overview of som e of the principal factors involved in evaluating 
these p rograms to include an in ternal solu tion (MPD) that som e agencies m ay seek to  
explore.  
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Evaluation Criteria for Technology 
 








Criteria    
Secure Yes Yes  Yes 
Cost Minimal Minimal (time) Minimal 
User friendly Claims to be Undeveloped Claims to be 
Accessibility Yes Unlikely (poor) Yes 
Flexibility to meet 
agency needs 






Access to unclassified 
data from Guardian 
Yes No No 
Ability to attach 
various files 
Yes Yes Yes 
Alert, warning and 
reporting capability 
Yes Limited  Yes 
Implementation 
guidance 
Limited None Very strong 
Partnerships/Sponsors Limited Limited (NCR) Very strong 
Training Limited  Limited knowledge Hands on; 
very strong 
Figure 6.   Evaluation Criteria 
Regardless of the strategy chosen, su ccessfully im plementing this technology 
requires a collaborative effort and strong leadership at the executive level. W ith chiefs, 
sheriff’s an d agency leaders s erving as champions of the chosen program , all 
subordinates m ust have clearl y delineated roles and respon sibilities in bringing this 
initiative to fruition. While the executive support is critical, the key com ponent is 
collaboration at all levels. As office rs will be th e primary reporters of infor mation, it is 
essential tha t they be in cluded in th e pla nning process and that they are com fortable 
working with the end product. This technology must ultimately be user friendly and must  
be accompanied by a feedback com ponent. If this initiative is too cumbersome and lacks 
follow up from either a detective or intelligence analyst, most officers are likely to avoid 
reporting suspicious activities through this mechanism.  
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D. BEYOND TECHNOLOGY: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND 
POTENTIAL REMEDIES TO ADDRESS THEM 
1. Policy Guidelines 
Agencies must institute policies/directives, which outline background, procedures  
and individual responsibilities.  This should include a dete rmination of where privacy 
policy, specifically 28 CFR Part 23, is appli cable. In order to adhere to national 
standards, organizations should also adhere to standardized codes and reporting form ats. 
Auditing reports and systems should also be directed by policy in order to ensure that the 
agency is in  compliance with privac y guidelines and that the appropriate screening and 
coding is being adhered to.  
2. Training  
In orde r f or SAR to be ins titutionalized and  becom e f ully ef fective, agency 
members and other key stakeholders m ust be adequately trained to r ecognize suspicious 
behavior and know how to report th eir observations. Recommendations for training will 
likely inc lude the incor poration of  train ing in to the recru it officer curriculum  and into  
annual in-service training for the rem ainder of the departm ent. W ith m any law 
enforcement agencies transitioning to distan ce learning, this effort will likely proceed 
through that venue, with the officers/official s taking an on-line test at the end of the 
lesson. Beyond police departm ent personnel, it is also im portant that the public, 
government officials and the priv ate sector are included in this training and education. 
This effort will also provide transp arency and answer outs tanding questions about th e 
program.  
3. Technology  
In im plementing th e P M-ISE ver sion of  SAR, participa ting agencie s will be 
hosting se rvers and nec essary equ ipment that  will allow f or inte rnet based acce ss by 
authorized users. Among the challenges is to make sure that privacy requirements are met 
and guarantee that no other departmental system s are adversely im pacted. As part of the  
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memorandum of agreem ent (process, project teams shoul d be dedicated to work with 
departmental IT s taff to toil through  any pot ential obstacles. Additionally , agencies may 
consider including SARs into all relevant types of fie ld reports to flag pertinent 
information, or incorporate this into existing electronic field reporting systems. This will 
improve the rapidity of getting the information into the hands of the designated person.  
As this p ilot im plementation p rogresses, th ere will likely  b e f urther ch allenges, 
which will need to b e addressed as they a rise. With a number of m ajor cities acros s the 
United States taking on the sam e project,  open lines of  communication will allow 
agencies to collectively work through i mpediments and successfully execute this critical 
information sharing in itiative. Federal guida nce will be vital throughout this proces s to 
ensure tha t standard ization is m aintained and  that sta te and local g overnments are 
provided with the resources and technical expe rtise to guide them  through this process. 
With homegrown terrorism emerging as a future threat, the nation’s state, local and tribal 
police officers m ust take a m ore active role in seeking to identif y terror ists tha t are  
presumably living amongst us. While fusion centers have provided one avenue to 
facilitate th e sharing o f infor mation, effec tively leverag ing technolog y to “create the 
dots” is imperative in using police resources to their utmost potential. 
E. CASE STUDY: THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT SAR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The Los Angeles Police  Department (LAPD) implemented its suspic ious activity 
reporting program in early 2008, becoming the first United States city to create a national 
standard for terrorism-related modus operandi codes. Since that time, it has experienced a 
number of success stories that have come about with increased awareness and subsequent 
reporting. C ommander Joan McNam ara of the LAPD provided a nu mber of success 
stories pertaining to both potentially terrorist and criminal activity.  
In developing this effort, the LAPD ’s Counter-Terrorism  and Crim inal 
Intelligence Bureau (C TCIB) sought to im prove the m anner in which it collects, 
maintains, analyzes, tracks and sha res information and incidents which have a potential 
nexus to terrorism . The se efforts were inte nded to institu tionalize a counter-terrorism 
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philosophy throughout the departm ent and st andardize internal procedures while 
providing a potential national m odel for si milar standardization. Initial requirem ents for 
establishing a SAR included: 
 Providing an intake or collection m ethod for infor mation that is not 
currently collected. 
 Involving f ront line officers in s upporting the institutionalization of 
counter-terrorism efforts department-wide. 
 Establishing the requirem ent to c omplete the report when personnel 
become aware of suspicious activ ity or information that indicates possible 
terrorism related activity or affiliations. 
 Utilizing th e cur rent D epartment I nvestigation Report which all of ficers 
are familiar with. 
 Involving m inor adjustm ent to the cu rrent Investigation R eport to allow 
for immediate recognition of a SAR related report. 
 Establishing the first of its kind te rrorism related Modus Operandi (MO)  
codes to capture suspicious  activity or inc idents believed to be re lated to 
terrorism. 
 Providing near real-time information capture for queries within the CCAD 
system in order to: 
 Assist in identifying patterns which may indicate potential targets , 
heightened activity of a specific na ture within a given tim e frame, 
a specific area or involving a spec ific person or place, and the 
identification of  trends in com parison to nation al or inte rnational 
occurrences.  
 Support the successful analysis and  synthesis o f infor mation and 
the production of actionable intelligence.  
 Supply year to date analysis of  activity to provide statistical 
support for determining the allocation of personnel, focus areas for 
training and the concentration of investigative, enforcem ent or  
protective and preventative efforts.  
 Provide fo r an asso ciated ab ility to ge ographically m ap 
occurrences.  
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As comm unity outreach  is an im portant p iece of program im plementation, the 
LAPD developed an o utreach m odel to e ngage, train and share in formation with  
community m embers, private stak eholders an d em ployees and adm inistrators at public 
and private infrastructure facilities. These efforts included infor mation delivery through 
community meetings and organizations, along w ith postings to the departm ent Web-site 
Departmental training is also a critical factor,  and as such, officers were trained in 
identifying activities that initially do not appear to indicate criminal behavior but where a 
wider perspective may reveal potential domestic or foreign terrorist related activity.  The 
Counter-Terrorism and Crim inal Intellig ence branch also d eveloped training m aterials 
and programs that were introduced through tr aining venues such as : Web-based training 
(e-learning), the Terro rism Liaison Officer (TLO) program, inclusion in the roll call 
training calendars and in se rvice training. T he exam ple provided below details the  
efficacy of this initiative in sharing information:   
In December 2008, a Van Nuys Narcotics Detective contacted detectives from the 
Los Angeles Police Departm ents Counter-Terro rism unit pertaining to the arrest of a 
suspect with inform ation about s ales of illegal as sault weapons , id entity theft and  
narcotics to supply Asian and Arm enian gangs .  As a result of this inform ation, the 
LAPD completed a suspicious activity report.   
Counter-terrorism detectives subsequently joined forces with the Federal Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm s and conduc ted an exten sive follow-up investigation,  
which resulted in several illegal weapons purch ases.  The purchases were then used to 
track the su pplier’s weapons and to  attempt other purchases  of illegal assault weap ons 
and explosives.  In January 2009, three illega l weapons purchases netted one 9mm sem i-
auto pistol, one .44 revolver, five Mac-10 assault pistols (one fully automatic) and several 
extended high capacity magazines and suppressors. 
The joint investigation led to the ser vice of a search warrant and ultimately to the 
arrest of three suspects.  Recovered in the searches were 21 weapons, including 10 assault 
rifles with numerous high capacity magazines, 280 rounds of .223 tracer amm unition and 
an inert hand grenade. This case illustrates how the diligence of one detective com bined 
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with the appropriate sharing of  information can have a dram atic impact on public safety. 
(J. McNamara, personal communication, July, 2009).  
F. SAR AND INFORMATION SHARING DURING THE 56TH 
PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURAL 
For years, non-federal law enforcem ent ag encies have been seeking access to  
greater intelligence pertaining to localized threats. In the post-September 11 environment, 
improved interaction and form alized re lationships have been among the m any 
improvements in the domestic information sharing realm between the federal government 
and its state, local and tribal partners. Along with this dramatic increase in the exchange 
of information, comes a secondary issue. Specifi cally, now that state, local and tribal law  
enforcement has acquired this sought afte r infor mation, how are they getting this 
information analyzed quickly and dissem inating an inte lligence pr oduct prom ptly to 
patrol officers in the field?  
In the W ashington, D.C., Metropolitan area,  these relationships were put to the 
test on January 20, 2009, when Barack H. Obam a was sworn in as the 44 th president of 
the United States.  As the nation’s first African-American president, this inauguration had 
greater significance than  any Investigation Report inaugural in recent h istory.  Bey ond 
the inauguration, a week of events includi ng service activities, a concert and n ational 
prayer service, required substantial planni ng and resources from  the law enforcem ent 
community and beyond.  
As the trans ition of power is paramount in  a th riving democratic society, it was  
important for this event to be accessible to the public, while at the same time providing a 
safe and secure env ironment for the m any spectators and dignitaries in attendance. 
Furthermore, providing for the security of  th e first African-Am erican presid ent and 
sharing threat information with partner agencies  and of ficers at all levels to achieve  this 
task was critical.   
The 2009 inauguration subsequently lived up to anticipated expectations, as it was 
the largest single-day event in the history of the nation’s capital. An estimated 1.8 million 
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people were present on the National Mall and along the inaugural parade route for the 
swearing-in ceremony, which posed challenges fo r a m yriad of agenci es and the city’s 
infrastructure.  
As the Departm ent of Hom eland Secu rity designated the 2009 Presidential 
Inauguration a National Special Security Even t (NSSE), the United States Secret Service 
assumed the lead responsibility for the coor dination of the operational security plan.  A 
number of sub-committees, including an inte lligence sub-committee, were es tablished to 
provide for synchronized efforts be tween the participating agencies . In addition to the 
agencies within the N ational Capitol Region,  the Metro politan Po lice Departm ent 
augmented its staffing with an additional 4,000 officers from 99 police departments from 
around the country. This aggregation of resour ces required that these personnel be kept 
abreast of actionable intelligence and maintain a heightened level of awareness.  
The Metropolitan Police Department implemented its suspicious activity reporting 
program just pr ior to th is event seeking to  expand the volum e of information ava ilable 
and address any potential threats. During the inaugural period, the MPD m apped SAR 
data to cap ture real-tim e incidents, suspiciou s packages  and events as part of the 
collection plan on the current threat.  
While there were numerous SARs subm itted during th is tim e period, two 
examples listed below portray the types of activity being reported: 
 The first exam ple involved a call f or a suspicious person believed to be  
taking photos at the railroad tracks. As the president and vice president 
were traveling to the District v ia tr ain, this type of behavior could be 
viewed as preoperational surveillance. Subsequently, this information was 
dispatched as a priority call and units  responded to the area to investigate. 
A SAR submission allowed MPD to cap ture the information on the  event 
and share this with law enforcement partners.  
 A second case involved a suspicious m ale at a local Starbucks. The m ale 
was wearing a backp ack and ac ting in a  manner which d rew attention to 
his behavior.  This tip was of note, as it c ame f rom the private sec tor, 
where outreach was conducted prior to  the inauguration on how to report 
suspicious behaviors, and again offi cers were called upon to investigate 
and collect infor mation on the activ ity. This example emphasizes the role 
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that the private sector plays in both understanding what constitutes 
suspicious behavior and having a mechanism to report it.  
While there were many tools used to enhance situational awareness and facilitate 
the shar ing of  inf ormation with the num erous agencies  and m ore specifically law 
enforcement agencies d edicated to this even t, the following apparatus played a pivotal 
role and again illustrate the role of technology: 
 CCTV: Cameras were used for multiple purposes. Command centers were 
able to share information pertaining to any disorder and crowd movements 
due and communicate directly to relevant field personnel.  
 Situational Alert Managem ent System (SAMS): SAMS was used to tra ck 
the movement of the 4,000 plus police officers from  the DC Metropolitan 
Police Departm ent and the 99 assisting agen cies. The system  tracked 
personnel move ments, provided a r unning resum e on all decisions and 
allowed for monitoring of real-time crime information.  
 Classified system s and bulletins: A series o f threats illustrated th e 
limitations in using classified in formation in crafting a product to 
disseminate intelligence to critical personnel responsible for protecting the 
city. W hile command personnel with ad equate clearance w ere privy to 
detailed inform ation, there were delays in sanitizing the infor mation to 
provide to officers in the field via teletypes and other electronic formats.  
 Use of  fusion centers as  a f orce multiplier: Regional and national fusion 
centers were used to supplem ent the W ashington Regional Threat and 
Analysis Center by coordinating syst ems and infor mation from  various 
sources. This coordination included incoming traffic highway enforcement 
in the sta tes of  Maryland and Virg inia as a deterren t to a terrorist threat. 
The allied agencies a lso rode Am trak and Marc trains  as a visib le 
deterrent. 
 Text m essaging: Due to the m agnitude of the crowd, there were tim es 
when basic phone service was lim ited. The use of text m essaging was a 
valuable tool in supplementing the existing communication options.  
 Shotspotter: this acoustically based gunshot detection system was used as 
a crim e-fighting tool to distingui sh gunshots from  non-gunshots (e.g., 
fireworks) to save both time and resources.  
 Joint Operations Command Center (JO CC): Over 23 allied agencies were 
assigned to  the M etropolitan Police Depar tments JOCC in ord er to 
facilitate communications to relevant agencies along the parade rou te and 
throughout the city and region. The allied agencies were provided access  
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to all techno logies to ensure situational awareness and provide for officer 
safety. As 15 separate comm and posts  were operational in the region, 
coordinated information sharing and command and control were vital to 
the success of the event.  
Even with the many technological applications to support the various inf ormation 
sharing initiatives, the key elem ent needed between the agencies was trust; beyond the 
technologies, trust rem ains the critical fact or in providing for a successf ul collaborative 
partnership. Previous coordina tion with f ederal partners in the Nation al Capitol Re gion 
during times of crisis exem plified the streng ths of the rela tionships and allowed the  key 
partners to work together  throu gh an extrem ely complex range of issues.  The 
technologies discussed throughout this chapter address the research questions: What types 
of technology can be leveraged to enhance this process, ensure privacy and provide for 
the security of classified information, as well as how SAR can be implemented and 
customized to meet agency needs as well as those of the information sharing 
environment. The fact that there are numerous options available, which leverage existing 
systems whi le allowing flexibility for technol ogy and respecting individual rights, is a 
positive indicator th at the existing ar chitecture can provide f or secure, s eamless sharing 
of information.   
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V. REALIZING THE GOALS OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 
FOR INFORMATION SHARING 
A. STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THE VISION 
1. Value Innovation for Enhancing the Collection and Dissemination of 
Domestic Information/Intelligence 
The vision for enhancing the collec tion and dissem ination of  dom estic 
information/intelligence is to  transform state,  local and tribal police officers nationwide 
into active collectors of information and leverage technology to enable them to both share 
the requisite information and receive actionable intelligence in retu rn. The Figures 7 and 
8 illustrate the goals to be achieved using the Blue Ocean Strategy as a guide.  
Eliminate:
Lack of access to information
Organizational/inter-agency silos
Information that fails to be analyzed
Intelligence failures (Inability of LE to 
connect the dots)
Raise:
Situational awareness of state, local, 
and tribal police officers
Amount of information being collected
Volume of intelligence being shared 
horizontally, vertically and inter-agency
Level of involvement beyond the 
police to other government entities, the 





Time frames in which information is 
collected, analyzed and distributed
Create:
Intelligence-led policing environment
A focused preventive LE community
An intelligence capacity for all LE 
agencies regardless of size
 




Strategy Canvas: Domestic LE collection and dissemination of information/intelligence
Eliminate Raise
Reduce Create
ER2C Grid: Status of Domestic LE information collection and Intelligence Sharing
Red Ocean Strategy = Current LE practices for collection/dissemination of 
Domestic information/Intelligence
Blue Ocean Strategy = Smart practices for Large-Scale Strategic Change
Application of Blue Ocean Strategy Principals:
1. Reconstruct Market Boundaries - Expand pool of stakeholders
2. Focus on the Big Picture - Greater IS capacity
3. Reach Beyond Existing Demand- Officers as first “Preventers”
4. Get Strategic Sequence Right - Effective Change Mgmt Strategy
5. Overcome Organizational Hurdles- Strategic Leadership
6. Build Execution Into Strategy - IT support and Institutionalization

















Situational awareness of state, local, and tribal 
police officers
Amount of information being collected
Volume of intelligence being shared horizontally, 
vertically and inter-agency
Level of involvement beyond the police to other 
government entities, the private sector, and 
community at large
Intelligence-led policing 
environment A focused 
preventive LE community
An intelligence capacity for all LE 
agencies regardless of size
Lack of access to information
Organizational/inter-agency silos
Information that fails to be 
analyzed Intelligence failures 





Time frames in which information is
collected,
analyzed and distributed
Current Red Ocean situation
Best Practice for Large-Scale Strategic Change




Figure 8.   Strategy Canvass, Blue Ocean Strategy (From Kim & Mauborgne, 2005)  
2. Blue Ocean Strategy for Enhancing the Collection of Information and 
Dissemination of Intelligence 
In order to affect the s uccessful implementation of suspici ous ac tivity repor ting 
throughout the Am erican law enforcem ent community, it is im portant to know who the  
relevant stakeholders are and what role th ey play in im plementing and institutionalizing 
this system. The power versus interest grid divides these stakeholders into four groups. 
The “players” are the most critical group as th ey have the greatest pow er and interest in 
the success of this program. As SAR requires the standardization of reporting throughout 
the country, it is im perative to have the s upport of the agencies  that represent LE 
throughout the nation. This includes organizations  such as the International Association 
of Chief s of  Police ( IACP), Major Cities  C hiefs Assoc iation, National Sher riff’s 
Association and other m ajor groups. Executi ve-level commit ment within individual 
agencies is also param ount. W ithout this individual executive s upport, agencies will 
likely fail to assure successful execution.  As the federal governm ent also plays a 
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significant role in the intelligence community and the SAR process,  key federal partners 
also have high interest/power in this pr ocess. Fusion center execu tives play a major 
operational role in this imple mentation and have  a ves ted interest in seeing this prosper. 
Selected IT representatives are also included as technology is vital for implementation. 
The second group, known as “subjects” ha ve a high level of interest in this 
process, but do not have the same level of  power as the players.  Police officers,  
public/private sector partners, intelligence analysts and the homeland security community 
at large would fall in to this category. Civil libertarian s m ay not be proponents of this 
enhanced collection process, however, they do have a high level of interest in ensuring 
that privacy and civil liberties are not violated.  
The “context setters” are prim arily politicians at all levels of governm ent. While 
they have g reat power to enable th is process,  the m ajority of  setters have little d irect 
interest in getting into the weeds involved in execution.  
The community at large and those public/private sector partners with no perceived 
stake in this  process or significan t concern abou t their particular sector are class ified in 
the “crowd” category. They have bo th a low le vel of power to impact this process and a  
similar level of interest.  
While the players can be seen as the most critical group in bringing this process to 
fruition, it is im portant to know who the relevant persons ar e within each category that 
have a role in seeing this through. Failure to include stakeholders  in the process will 
likely result in the failure of this initiative.  The figure below represents the key personnel 
in this effort and classifies them into various categories based upon their positions.  
  
Figure 9.   Power Versus Interest Grid (From Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
1. Strategy for Bringing Innovation to Fruition 
a. Value Innovation 
The value innovation being applied to  the efforts for enhancing the  
collection and dissem ination of dom estic information/intelligence relies on a 
reconstructionist view of strategy. This strategy focuses on endogenous creativity to work 
beyond the existing m arket stru cture. Rath er than  relying on traditional form s o f 
intelligence collec tion and dissem ination, which great ly lim its both the num ber of 
collectors and recipients, the new paradigm  to  transf orm state, local and triba l p olice 
officers nationwide into active collectors of  information and requires m oving beyond the 
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inclusion of m ere intelligence specialists. This strategy calls for a non-zero sum  ga me, 
which expands beyond law enforcem ent and ge nerates a new level of dem and for both 
collectors and recipients of information/intelligence.  
b. Planning  
Using the o utline identified in the book Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim  & 
Mauborgne, 2005) as a guide, the m ajor differ ences between Bryson’s (2004) strategic 
planning principles and those identif ied by Brafm an and Be ckstrom in the Starfish and 
the Spider (2006) predom inantly pertain to hi erarchy and leader ship. Bryson (2004) 
emphasizes the im portance of strong leadership and strategic acto rs to institu te strategic 
change, while starf ish c ommunities em phasize the absence  of  leadersh ip, struc ture and 
formal organization. While there are sign ificant differences between these two 
approaches, there are als o a num ber of sim ilarities that would be v iable to the  strategic 
planning process.  
c. Organizational Structure  
The applied process to im plement t he value innovation discussed in this 
thesis em ploys a hybrid organizational stru cture. W hile there is still centralized 
leadership, hierarchy and consolidated bureau cracy, there is a decentralized network of  
collectors and consumers. This network greatly  expands the flow of infor mation coming 
into the sys tem and empowers the m any par ticipants to ad d value to the overarch ing 
mission of keeping the country safe.  
d. Leadership  
Implementing a vigorous suspicious ac tivity reporting program requires a 
strong commitment by the leadership of th e agency in both sponsoring and cham pioning 
the strateg ic process. At the sam e tim e, th is process calls f or a network effect where 
every additional provider of infor mation adds value to the larger network and enriches 
the information. Facilitating the process and fo stering collecting leadership are im portant 
similarities incorporated in both models.  
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Just as the starfish strategy ackn owledges that knowledge is spread 
throughout an organization and that the best knowledge of ten lies at the fringe, both 
strategic processes recognize the value of understanding the people involved (including 
oneself) and the need to en courage people to take risk s and explore unconventional  
solutions to  existing ch allenges. Trust is a critical com ponent of  the process as  risk 
assumes that people will be stepping out of their com fort zones and possibly m aking 
mistakes. Understanding the desire for people to m ake a  contribution to the m ission, 
creative thinking should be rewarded and multiple sources of insight should  be 
encouraged.  
Another common aspe ct of both appro aches pertains to the need for a 
staunch advocate, who has a conviction to seeing the process through. W hile a process 
sponsor would be a chief of police or a top-le vel official w ith positional power to direct 
resources and guide the process, the cham pion—or catalyst—can come from any level in 
the organization. This person is tasked with managing the daily processes of the strategic 
plan and  p ulling the  team  m embers togethe r when f ocus is  los t. K ey tr aits of  this  
individual would include: str ong interpersonal skills, em otional intelligence and the 
ability to foster both trust and inspiration.  
As part of a hybrid organization, both chiefs (bosses) and catalysts are 
critical to the stra tegic planning p rocess. W ith the cata lyst working in an unstru ctured 
environment, they have the ability to expa nd the network of involvement and achieve the 
mission that is envision ed by the agency di rector. W hile operating at different levels, 
strong leadership in both of these positions is critical to success.  
Combining various parts of the diverse strategies would be the best way to 
describe the construction of th is strategic planning process. In seeking to establish a new 
paradigm in inform ation sharing, executive leadership m ust becom e well versed and 
thoroughly knowledgeable about th e task at hand and be both comm itted and passionate 
about instituting this strategic change. In doing so, executive leaders realize the criticality 
of collecting, analyzing and sharing suspic ious activity in  preventing  both crim e and 
terrorism. 
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e. Collaborative Advantage 
As this comprehensive information sharing initiative entails expanding the 
network of collectors and consum ers, a co mmon national m ethodology is essential to 
provide for both standardization and consistency. Technology is also a critical component 
as it allows  for acces s to inform ation and im parts the ability to quick ly and accu rately 
analyze the data provided. The theory of collaborative ad vantage als o applies to  this 
strategy, as it requires the synergistic efforts of literally thousands of agencies at all levels 
of government. Leadership, commitm ent, determ ination and trust are once ag ain 
ubiquitous amongst all of these strategic options.  
2. Interagency Strategic Planning Process for the Implementation of 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (Synopsis) 
 After gaining a thorough understandi ng of the task at hand and the 
importance of expanding the current information sharing environm ent, 
executive leadership understands the power of networking and 
communicates this vision throughout the organization.  
 While sponsoring the SAR process, the executive also  designates an  
advocate, who can serve as the catalys t and facilitate (or coordinate the 
facilitation of) the strategic planning process.  
 In fostering collective leadership, mean ingful processes are established to 
provide for the inclusion of vast and innovative ideas from throughout the 
organization. Employees are encouraged to take risks and trust is instilled 
in the agencies values.  
 Management and catalysts m easure, monitor and m anage the process and 
work collaboratively to implement policy decisions.  
 Processes a re continua lly tweaked  to im prove quality o f eff orts and 
expand catalysts throughout the organization. As a result, the program will 
ultimately be institutionalized into th e agency’s culture and will be m ore 
easily expanded across agency boundaries.  
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C. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES 
The proliferation of technology will c ontinue to expand the possibilities for 
enhancing and expediting information sharing both within and beyond the law 
enforcement community. W hile fusion cen ters con tinue to hold  g reat prom ise for 
maximizing the efficacy of collected inform ation and th e subsequent analysis to meet a 
range of ag ency m issions, thes e centers  are still developing baseli ne capabilities  to  
provide for consistency and standardized app roaches. W hile m any centers  comm enced 
operations with a focus on counter-terrorism intelligence, many have grown to take on an 
“all hazards,” “all crimes,” or some sort of integrated variation of these approaches. The 
National Strategy for Information Sharing (White House, 2007) calls for the development 
of baseline operational standards. The development of these standards will be imperative 
for supporting future operati onal capabilities to includ e SAR analysis and risk 
assessments.  
On July 22, 2009, the Departm ent of Hom eland Security issued  a press release 
with the heading “Secretary Napolitano Re leases Report on Department’s Progress 
Fulfilling 9 /11 Comm ission Reco mmendations.” In r eference to co llaboration and 
information sharing, the release highlighted the following statement:  
To im prove collaboration and inform ation sharing, DHS has established 
new law e nforcement agreem ents across all levels of governm ent—
including two agreem ents between  DHS  and the Department of Justice 
signed since June to com bat ar ms and drug trafficking—and forged 
international agreem ents with Ca nada, Germ any, Greece,  Italy, Mexico, 
Portugal and Spain since January to share inform ation to com bat serious 
crime and collaborate on science and technology. DHS has also worked 
with federal, state, local and tribal law enforcem ent to designate 72 s tate 
and local F usion Centers across the c ountry to centralize intelligence 
gathering a nd share  in formation within  their  jur isdictions and with  the 
federal gov ernment—and provided  m ore than $340 m illion to support 
these centers since 2004. (DHS, 2009) 
This statement illustrates the relianc e that the Departm ent of Hom eland Security 
has on fusion centers in advancing the flow of both inf ormation and in telligence in the 
future. Privacy policies  may inhibit research efforts that would preclu de agencies  from 
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providing information that can be u sed to m easure the spectrum of accomplishm ents or 
failures of these centers. However, through su rveys, interviews, case studies and other 
research methods, there are num erous additional metrics that can be effectively utilized  
for evaluation purposes. Future research opportunities pertaining to fusion centers as well 
as collaborative efforts to im prove collaboration and inf ormation sharing at a ll levels of 
government are abundant. Efforts to share info rmation with the m ajority of the nation’s 
smaller state, tribal and local law enforcem ent agencies th at comprise approximately 75 
percent of this population is of particular pr ecedent as m any of th e current efforts are 
focused on the larger and predominantly urban departments.  
Beyond law enforcem ent reliance on public and private partners, reliance on the 
community at large is an integral facet to a comprehensiv e information sharing effort. A 
well developed community-based intelligence collection model is essential to the overall 
goal of reducing crime and preventing terrorism.  Just as efforts are being made to engage 
private stakeholders, employees and adm inistrators at pu blic and pr ivate inf rastructure 
facilities, future efforts to better engage, train and share information with the community 
at large must be explored.  Inquiries into th e use of,  relevance and practicality of social 
networking sites such as “twitter” and “facebook,” provide great opportunities to explore 
how evolving technologies factor into the means for which information is currently being 
disseminated and opportunities for the governm ent to capitalize on these contem porary 
phenomenon. Concurrently, this also poses the dilemm a of researching any specific 
technologies as innovative products continue to be devised at a rapid pace.  
One of  the greate st impediments to the tim ely dissemination of  intelligence has 
been the classification or over classification of  intelligence products.  Even with the vast 
improvements in the flow of infor mation between the federal governm ent and its tribal, 
state and lo cal coun terparts, sanitiz ing inte lligence f or diss emination to patro l of ficers, 
first responders and other ke y stakeholders wit hout clearances can prove daunting. 
Greater efforts m ust be m ade to expedite  and  standardize the clearan ce process  and 
actionable intelligence needs to be just tha t—passed on quickly in order to be acted on. 
Studies into expediting the clearance proces s and sim plifying the classification syste m 
will allow future efforts  to be m ore inclus ive with an expanding pool of partners . As 
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information and intelligence can only be eff ective when acted upon, it is vital that better 
methods of communicating with  both collectors and consumer s be identified, evaluated 
and utilized. While restrictions on research m ay be imposed on these empirical inquiries 
due to the real-life contex t of these m odern occurrences and the a mbiguous boundaries 
between the experience and the context, future case studies m ay offer a valid m eans to 
provide answers to common questions of a similar nature.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Just as the National Commission on Terrorist  Attacks (20 04) cited a “failure of 
imagination” in failing to prevent the att acks of September 11, 2001, the prospects to use 
our im aginations in embracing  and  pursi ng new opportun ities for collaborating  and 
sharing information hold infinite possibility. Leadership and imagination in looking at old 
problems in new ways  and accepting responsibility to initiate change in a perio d of 
increasing complexity is param ount in keep ing the hom eland safe and guaranteeing the 
safety of future generations.  
The research and arguments made in this thes is delineate the course of action for 
establishing a national capacity to better “collect and connect the dots” through the use of 
technology, acceptance and implementation of the suspicious activity reporting in itiative 
and through a comm itment to partnerships and collaboration at all le vels to ensure that 
agencies have complete access to relevant information impacting their jurisdictions. Over 
the past eight years, elaborate plans have been created and visions articulated on methods 
for im proving the inform ation sharing environm ent. W hile state, loca l and tr ibal la w 
enforcement and other partners are taking on a greater role, f ederal guidance is essential 
in providing for consistent funding, traini ng, and the facilitation of technology for the  
collection and sharing of data and intelligence.  
Identified policies and practices provided describe m ethods that are currently 
being used or that are proposed for use as well as guidance for implementation. While the 
appropriate technologies for achieving the pres cribed information sharing goals are still 
being worked out, there is a comm itment on the federal level to m aking the selected tool 
work. The greater challenge lies in prom oting inte lligence-led polic ing to  sm aller 
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agencies, which currently have no intelligence capacity. Leadership at all levels of law 
enforcement is n eeded to build  a b lueprint for this outreach  plan that leverages  existing 
systems, while b eing f lexible f or techno logy that provides for seam less sharing of 
information. Only when everyone shares th is comm itment to partnerships, using 
technology and standardization, wi ll our country realize this potential to overcome these 
persistent impediments that have hindered information sharing. 
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